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To different people the same terms and phrases may carry
different meanings. It is important to unify the conceptual
meanings of these terms so that all can understand each other and
find out exactly what we are discussing.
There are causes of all behaviour. To all rational beings
a behaviour must be justified before it is undertaken.
Thus, this introductory chapter serves the purposes of:
(1) defining the conceptual meanings of some terms employed in
this study,
(2) defining the boundaries of the study,
(3) giving justification for the study, and
(4) outlining the content of this thesis.
1.1 ROLEOF INVESTMENTIN ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT
The fingers and brains of menin the under-
developed countries are muchlike the
fingers and brains of their more prosperous
brethen but men in the advanced nations
work with a plentiful supply of capital
goods built up over the years.
-Paul A. Samuelson-I
+ The author does not agree completely with Dr. Samuelson. The brains
of people of the LDCSare dis-similar to those of the people in the MOOS
unless humanknow-howis capitalised.
2The term investment carries different meanings to
different walks of people. In this study the meaning is two-
sided. Firstly, by investment we expect the emergence of machinery,
factory buildings, a new organisation, a new business, etc. This
is to say it excludes the channeling of moneyin stocks, etc., or
in portfolio investment or any •a.:ther forms of indirect investment.
We are only converned with what people called direct investment.
But, we, unlike the economists, who include only the hardware (real
capital), are concerned with the software (human assets) as well.
Secondly, we, like the economists, are interested mainly in
the flow concept. We concern ourselves with the whys and bows
of the increases and decreases-of capital.
The exact meaning of economic development2is more difficult
to define, though most people share more or less similar views
concerning it.+ Professor Charles Poor Kindleberger perhaps has
summarised most people's opinions. He says economic development
implies both more output and changes in the technical and
institutional arrangements by which it is produced 2. But generally,
+ Different economists have different concepts about development.
The more commonones include the ideas of increase in national
income and/or per capita income, new methods of production, higher
productivity, new goods or new quality goods, new markets, new
(sources of) materials, new economic and social organisations, more
equal distribution of income and wealth, to mention a few.
3for simplicity's sake, development can roughly be defined as
the increase of per capita income through better production methods
and the comparative status of development can be measured by the
differences in per capita income±o
It is still more difficult to evaluate the results of
economic development. Economic development is no synonymfor
increase of welfare or happiness. The only benefit, perhaps, is
the greater control of the environment ++3. However, when the
LDC's come into contact with the MDC'Sand feel the gap, the
attraction of material riches, the unlimited desires, etc. will
make economic development a necessity.
Investment and development are twin brothers. In most
economic literatures it is the process of capital accumulation
that occupies the front of the stage: AdamSmith's specialisation,
David Ricardo's land, Schumpeter's innovation theory, Rostow's
stages of growth, Hick's capital cycle etc. to nameonly a few,
+ It must be borne in mind that per capita income, though having a
very high correlation with economic development, does not necessarily
meanso (Kuwait certainly is a. good example of the case). However,
since the main theme of this study is not concerned mainly with
economic development, it is attempted merely to give a rough concept
to this matter. Besides, this is justified because even some
development economists use US$600 as the watershed for LDC's and
MDC's(see Hazen ) .
++ The cry for pollution, social evils because of industriali-
sation etc. hint of doubt even on this point.
4all emphasize the importance of investment in economic development.
Even Karl Marx, who predicted the downfall of the
capitalists, realised that the exploitation of the working class is
necessary for capital formation and development as well as the
ultimate dictatorship of the proletariate.
Thus, undoubtedly,
If only you have capital, development is easy
the more capital you invest, the faster you will
develop. Conversely, if you are not developing very
fast, blame the rate of capital investment. Capital
represents purchasing power over all the other factors
of production, so that there can be no shortage of
any of those factors that doss not yield to an
adequate supply of capital.
1.2 TIM IMPORTANCEOF FOREIGNINVESTMENT
The new lands need not develop
still unborn Newtons to discover
the law of gravity: need not go on
the slow meandering climb of the
Industrial Revolution: they can
find in any machine catalogue
wonders undreamedof by the
great inventors of the past.
6- Paul A. Samuelson -
Thoughimportant, capital acculumation seems to have no
reasons to be the dominating force for economic development.
As Cairncross7 points out, should innovation stand still,
at most one-quarter of economic progress can be explained by
capital accumulation
Besides, if we accept the economists' concept of a diminishing
marginal rate of return, and if technology stands still, to a
certain point the marginal efficiency of investment will become
zero. This is the point which represents the maximumamount of
capital accumulation. (This is the base of the classical economists,
including Smith, Ricardo, Mara, etc., making economics a 'dismal'
science.
Of course, it is very well for the LDCs' to copy the more
advanced technology. But is not technology embodied in the form of
complex capital goods? Is it not knownthat the LDC's are short
of capital? So, how can they copy superior technology? But the
cost of out-of-date methods does not represent cheaper ways of
production. Quite often, the more advanced methods of production
+ Cairncross assumes'that:
1 Capital accumulation out of saving is 10f of national income.
2 Additional investment yields an average return of 5%,
3 Therefore. the increase in income
4 In fact income rises at a rate of 2-3% per year.
5 This indicates that at most only 4 of economic progress is
explained by capital accumulation.
6do not mean more costly metnoaso besiaes, tney use the money from
depreciation to buy obsolete machines to duplicate the fagile
projects. Instead, they can buy new innovative ones.8
Moreover, in most cases, moneyis not the main problem.
Many rich countries, such as Kuwait, are very poor and backward.
Capital accumulation serves three purposes:
(1) It permits the introduction of more round-about methods of
production.
(2) It serves for the purpose of economic widening - higher
population, more land etc.
(3) It allows technical progress to take place.
History has eliminated the classical economists' fear of
a stagnant state. The economic conditions of the MDC's are still
improving and there is no sign of slowing down. In fact,, contrarily,
the gap between the MDC's and the LDC's is widening.
Moreover, technology progress can only be beneficial if
the technology is used. A country may have knownthe opportunity
for fruitful use of capital without applying this opportunity in
production at all. The problem is often quite as muchas of capital
accumulation and technological invention.
7It is usually not the lack of capital that hinders growth
but the failure to adopt up-to-date techniques. The low quantity
of saving and investment in the LDC's are not the only problems.
Equally serious is the fact that the qualitative composition of
investment is often bad from the stand point of national develop-
ment. Most of the limited savings of India go into hoarding of
gold and jewellry, using up its scarce foreign exchange.
In order to have new innovations, R D are necessary.
However, R D are really too costly for the LDC'S. Besides, it
is doubtful if the LDC's are advanced enough to pursue any R D
of importance.
Luckily, though they cannot innovate and invent, they have
the privilege of imitating. They need not go through the Industrial
revolution: they can find in any machine catalogue wonders undreamed
of by the great inventors of the past.
Hong Kong has a per capita income of about US$820f. According
to Hagen11 she should be classified as an 10C. However, it is also
true that Hong Kong has fought to be treated as an LDC+. Thus, it
is fair to say that Hong Kong has attained the necessary pre-
conditions and is ready to take-off, to use Rostow's terms 12o
One cannot expect too muchoriginal innovation and invention from
such an economy.
+ For the purpose of being able to get preferential tariffs.
8Table 1.1
Estimates of Total Population
(Hong Kong)
1947 - 1972



























Source: Hong Kong Government, Census and Statistics Department:
Hong Kong Statistics, 1947 - 1967, 1969 Hong Kong Government
Hong Kong 1973, Report for the Year 1972, Hong Kong
GovernmentPress, 1973.
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Not only are the firms in Hong Kong mostly small in size,
but the economyis small too. Hong Kong has both a small population
and a small national product, as shownin Table 1.1 and Table 1.2.,
We therefore cannot get the advantages of the economies of
agglomeration enjoyed by the more industrialised countries.
Thus, (to use an illustration from marketing)
locally produced packaged consumer goods in the
less-developed country may have difficulty
competing with imported versions because of the
more primitive package designs of the local
items the local market is not large enough to
support even a single professional package-
design firm, so the producer must do his own
such work.
Although we are not as primitive as that', we are lagging behind in
the development of high-technology machines. Thus, in order to
survive, Hong Kong has to adopt foreign technology. One of the
most important resources of technological diffusion of foreign
technology is through foreign investment here. As is indicated
by Table 1.3, our technological diffusion rate is comparatively
high.
At the same time, because the traditional Chinese are less
agressive, less entrepreneur-like, the incoming of foreigners not
only meansan increase of capital, an inflow of new techniques,
but a quicker change of the Chinese culture to a more capitalistic
manner.
+ Actually the regional headquarter for design is moving to Hong
Kong.
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Table 1.2 Estimated of Gross Domestiic Product in Hong Kong and Growth Rates
(6)(5)(2) (4)(3)(1) ^1L_ 1Census Stat LiuChanMa SzezeDanik Eco Research Centre Chang
Value GrowthValue Growth% Value Growth% Value Growth7o Value Urowtn
I IIYear
1846 19511948 1737
1949 2214 27.46 2428 2563 31.37
1950 2711 22.45 291 7 3077 20.05
1.632962 3121951 2834 4.54
-7.771952 3143 10.9 2734 2884
13, 04 2865 4.8530241 953 3553
1954 7.183965 11.60 3066 5241
1955 3373 3563 9.94
195E 3697 3902 9.51
1957 3970 41 90 7.38 4465
6.041 958 I II I II4208 4443 435
1959 15.98 16.584702 4967 11.79 4950 5156 5290
1960 60115345 5645 13.65 5670 8.76 8.14 60455741
1961 6091 6431 13.92 6438 13.55 6244 6500 14.27 14.zb 6885
1962 6854 7239 12.56 13.93 13.757315 1427 774E
7 816 8256 14.05I yes 8129 8448 14.11 14.06 8830
1964 8826 9326 12.96 9276 9636 11 .07 11.11 10000
Iyb5 10303 10705 10.97 11.18 11000
12
1210011433 11902 96145.705.541966
6.212066 1 2580 11.30 12.00 102071967
11.713403 14090 13.20 13.46 114011968
12.215203 15986 11.91 12.02 127891969
14864 16.21970
Note: All values in Millions of tong Kong Qvlldr:3
Sources: ('1) R. A. Na and E.F. Szczepanik: The National Income of Hong xong: i yi j yv
1955, P• 1 and P. 177
E. F. Szczepanik: The Economic Growth of Hong Kong, 1958,
(2) K. R. Chou: The Hong Kong Economy, 1966, P. 84
(3) E. R. Chang: Report on the National Income Survey of Hong Kong, 1960 - 61 ,
P. 107
(4) L. C. Chau: Domestic Product, 1959 - 69, Hong Kong Economic Papers,
Pp. 29 - 30
(5) Census and Statistic Department: Estimates of Gross Domestic Product:
1966 - 71, 1973, P. 21
(6) T. B. Lin: Monetary Behaviour Under the Sterling Exchange Standard:
Hong Kong as a, Case Study, EconomicResearch Centre, Hong Kong Series -
Occasional Paper 1, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1971, P. 49
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Table 1.3
Rate of Technological Changein the I'Tanufacturing
Sector of Slected Economies
Method of




Hsia1962-1970Hong Kong 2.0 (G)







DomarU.K. 1 950-1959 0.7 (A)
Note: (A) Arithmetic index
(G) Geometric index
Source: Economics Department, the University of Hong Kong
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1.3 What is Foreign
The creatures outside looked from
pig to man, and from man to pig,
and from pig to man again but
already it was impossible to say
which was which
- George Orwell -14
Because of its peculiar position, it is rather difficult
to define exactly the meaning of foreign in Hong Kong. It can be
easily pointed out that capital from the United States, Japan,
Australia, etc. as foreign capital and peoples from those places
are foreign peoples. However, as to the British and the Chinese
capital as well as the British and the Chinese, it is rather difficult
to define whether they are local or foreign.
Since Hong Kong is a British Crown Colony, it is rediculous
not to treat British capital as local capital. Besides, many British
firms (e.g. Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank,, Jardine and Matheson) +are
so very deeply rooted in Hong Kong that they are every inch local.
But, at the same time someof the British companies, expecially those
established in the,past few years, actually operate differently from
typical Hong Kong firms. They do not consider themselves Hong Kong
either.
It is fair to consider that. the Chinese who originally lived
in Hong Kong as local people and their moneyas local capital.
See Section 2.1
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However, how about the refugees who came from China since 1949? Still
harder to categorise, perhaps, are the Chinese and their capital
flowing into Hong Kong in the past few years ++0
There is an analogue in the study of moneyeconomics.
Different economists define money differently. The law, however,,
provides the answer to this problem - Money is what the law says
it isl 5
Thus, we can solve the problem by classifying foreign
companies as those which consider themselves foreign+.
1.4 Foreign Direct Investment in the Manufacturing Industries
We have looked into the reasons to study foreign operations
and defined what foreign operations are, It is time we looked into
the reasons for specifying direct investment in the manufacturing
companies as the scope of this study.
International operations in business can be classified into:
(1) International business activities without foreign management:which
can again be sub-classified as
(a) Importing and exporting
Luckily there is no wholly-owned manufacturing companycoming to
Hong Kong recently from either Mainland China or Taiwan (though
there is one Taiwan. Hong Kong joint venture),




(d) Contractual arrangement and
(2) International business activities with direct foreign management:
which includes:
(a) Sole direct foreign investment (100% ownership)
(b) Joint-ventures and
(c) International services.16
Imports and exports and portfolio investments provide little
opportunity for improvements in technology or manufacturing methods
and make less contribution to the host country. Licensing and
contractual arrangements would represent compromisesfor minimising
foreign interference in the affairs of the LDCs and still allowing
them to benefit from the fruits of the MDCs' innovations. However,
the LDCscan only managethe licensed or contractually arranged
operations with well-trained managementteams. The LDCs are ire
in need of the managementteams than the machinery.
Direct foreign investment involves both the transmission
of managerial skills and new technologies. Thus, it is a more
meaningful subject to study.
International services can in fact be classified either
as sole direct foreign investment or joint venture, thus, they can
be left out of this study.
17
As to the joint venture, the objectives, philosophies,
policies of the partners of the joint ventures are often not exactly
co-inside-with each other. This will result un-necessary conflicts.
Therefore, in order to isolate the forces affecting a foreign
operation, joint ventures are omitted from this study.
rianuiacturing companies are only cnosen as oojects for
this study because Hong Kong relies on Manufacturing as a means for
survuval. Besides, manufacturing companies are at the fore-front
of international operations. Most companies that go abroad will
eventually establish production points abroad.
18
References
(1) Paul A. Samuelson: Economics, $th Edition, International
Student Edition, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Kogakusha Company
Limited, Tokyo, 1970, P. 745
(2) Charles P. Kindleberger: Economic Development, Second Edition,
International Student Edition, McGraw-Hill Book Company,
Kogakusha Company, 1965, P. 3
(3) W. A. Lewis: The Theory of Economic Growth, Homewood,Illinois,
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1955, Pp• 420 - 435
(4) Everett E. Hagen: The Economics of Development, Richard D. Irwin
Inc., Homewood,Illinois, 1968
(5) A. K. Cairncross: Factor in Economic Development, Third Edition,
George Allen Unwin, 1964, P. 89
(6) Paul A. Samuelson: Economics, 8th Edition, International
Student Edition, Mcgraw-Hill Book Company,KogakushaCompany
Limited, Tokyo, 1970
(7) A. K. Cairncross: Factor in Economic Development, Third Edition,
George Allen Unwin, 1964
(8) Ibid. Pp. 75 - 88
(9) John L. Espy: Hong Kong as an Environment for Industry ,
Chung hi Journal, Vol. 10, Nos. 1 and 2. October, 1971
(10) Everett E. Hagen: The Economicsof Development, Richard...D...Irwin
Inc., Homewood,Illinois, 1968
(11) W.W. Rostow: Stages of EconomicGrowth, 1960
(12) H. Sutu and others: Smaller Business Development, 1968
(13) Richard H. Holton: Marketing Policies in Multinational Corporations,
California ManagementReview, Summer,1971, Vol. XIII, No. 4
(14) George Orwell: Animal Farm: A Fairy Story, Longman, 1964, P. 88
(15) Lester V. Chandler: The Economics of Money and Banking, Fourth
Edition, 1964
(16) Farmer and Richman: International Business: An Operation Theory,
Irwin, 1966, Chp. 2
(17) John L. Espy: Hong Kong as an Environment for Industry,
ChungChi Journal, Vol. 10, Nos. 1 and 2, October, 1971
19
CHAPTERJ I
Economics of Foreign Investment
2.1 History of International Operations
The people who do not study history will
repeat it.
SomeEarlier Firms'
As early as the sixteenth Century the Medici (of Florence)
had established foreign branches in Rome, Lyons, Bruges, London and
elsewhere.
Although founded on Medici capital, the branches
owed their development to the pioneer knowledge
of banking the Medici family had built up at home
in Florence. They provided an early instance of
how practical and profitable it can be for a
business to spread internationally on a basi of
exclusive but early transported know-how .
The earliest international operations can in fact be traced as far
back as the Han Dynasty. The Chinese traded with the Japanese,
Indians, Persians, South East Asians as well as the Romans. Nor
was overseas trade unknownin the early Western Civilization. But
such operations are outside the scope of this study.
Readers are reminded the exploitation of technological advantages
(know-how) is no-:-innovation of modernbusinessmen. This capitalisation
of know-how is one of the most important-reasons for modern
manufacturing companies to go abroad. (See Section 2.2 below).
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The Fuggers of Augsburg (in the Sixteenth Century) and the Rothchilds
of Frankfurt (in the Nineteenth Century) are other examples. The
Lombard Street bankers went abroad by establishing subsidiaries or
branches. Amongthem is our Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, which is not
only the largest bank in Hong Kong, but one of the largest international
banks in the world*2
In the trading industry there was the British East.:.. Indian
Company(1599 - 1858), which not only acted as a linkage between the
East and the West, but actually ruled India for Centuries. Another one,
the-Hudson's Bay Company, founded in 1670 in Canada which has survived
through the years and continues to receive directions from London30
It iQ, of course, unfair to leave Jardine and Matheson4 out of the
picture. It is still playing a dominant role in the business world
of HongKong.
International operations in the fields of manufacturing,
though late-starters, were by no meansunknown. In 1876 the du Po n is
purchased two Canadian powder mills. Edison opened a branch, which
became the Canadian General Electric Companyin 1883. Others included
Colgate, Coca-Cola, G.E., N.C.R., United Shoe Machinery, International
Havester, Standard Oil, and so on.+
Only the larger ones are included.
21
In Europe Nobel founded his first branch in Germany in 1866
and then extended all over Europe. The Lever Brothers went abroad in
1899 (which lated amalgamated with Margine Unie to form Unilever in
1929). Other earlier European firms included Nestle, Brown-Boveri,
Hoffman-La Roche, Royal Dutch, Shell, I.C.I., Philips, Siemens, etc.
From the above account we can deduce the followings:-
(1 International financial facilities developed first and were
important in the earlier days.
(2) Trading (exporting and importing) was the major international
operation (as was represented by the establishment of the British
East Indian Companyetc.).
(3) Direct foreign investment was found in the colonial traditional
business (as was represented by the British East Indian Company).
(4) Direct foreign investment in the manufacturing field was an ex-
ception rather than a usual practice and its emergence is of a
more recent phenomenon.
The Aggregate Picture
Before 1913 the World's foreign operations were dominated
by the British++. To show its significance, in the year 1900 about
three-quarters of the world's f.oragn investment were in the hands of
the British4.
This is inevitable because it was the first industrialised country
and had goods, capital as well as know-howto export.
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Table 2.1 British Foreign Investment and Yields, 1870 - 1880
Yield in TotalMarket
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1911 688 3 80 270373 19351 y4 38 32 351587
1914 755 148515 379 319 722
Source: Cairncross (6)
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The main type of foreign investment was in the form of
portfolio investment. Direct investment was relatively unknown.
Table 2.1 show a very clear picture of this point and it is self-
explanatory. More than half of the British investment abroad was in
the form of bonds to forign governments. Another one-fifth was in the
field of transportation (which again were mainly portfolio). Only part
of the remaining investment (under the heading of Miscellaneous)
represented direct foreign investment. Portfolio investment was
favoured because the yield in dividends for this lower risk investment
was, if not higher than direct investment, comparable to it.
The moneywas mainly invested in the fast growing countries
or the so called regions of recent settlement. It concentrated in
North America, Australia and South America. Table 2.2 indicates a
clear picture of thiso
Before 1913 (World War I) the international flow of capital
amounted to a significant figure. It had risen from the four billion
U.S. dollars in 1864 to forty-four billion dollars in 1913.
By 1913, though U.K.'s importance be decreased, nevertheless,
it still accounted for more than 40FJ of the World's credit. (In 1900
the U.K. accounted for 4 of the World's total credit). (See Table 2.3)
Again the capital mainly flowed to the Americas and Australia, (the
region of recent settlement ), followed by Russia, Central and
Southern Europe. The Eastern Civilization got only a small stake.
26
Table 2.3
The World's Total Investment By 1913
Source of Capital Amount(U.S. $) /
United Kingdom 18 billion 41
France 9 billion 20
Germany 5.8 billion 13
Belgium, Netherlands
and Switzerland 505 billion 13
United States 3.5 billion 8
Others 202 billion 5
Total 44.0 billion 100
Source: Calculated from figures given in John H. Dunningot
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(See Table 2.4), From the Continental point of view Europe got the
most with 12 billion dollars, followed by North America, South
America, Asia, Africa and Oceania. (See Table 2.5)
At this time portfolio investment was still the dominating
form of international capital. In the year 1914 90 of the world's
total international investment was in the form of portfolio investment
and 85% of U. K.'s investment was in the form of fixed interest bearing
securities. The example of U.K.'s international investment in Table
2.6 indicates the relative importance of the different kinds of foreign
investment in that era.
During the period between the two Wars we see that two
things happened in international investment. One was that the U.S.
had emerged as one of the leading exporters of capital whereas the
European Powers were transformed from substantial creditors into
substantial debtors. The second was that foreign investment in the
1920's concentrated on direct investment and social over-head
construction projects.
The inefficiency and lack of experience of the emerging
Americans, together with the collapse in raw material prices
contributed to the thirties'being a dividing line in the history
of foreign investment. Portfolio investment/ debts could not be
served properly and thus ended the future of portfolio investments
abroad.
Contrarily, direct (foreign) investment proved more
resilient and recovered in the late thirties. This laid a foundation
Table 2.4





10018 billion65.0 billion 28 1.0 billion1.2 billion 66United Kingdom+
1009 billion1 .9 billion 21 5.5 billion 611.6 billion 18France
1005.8 billion1.0 billion 18 3.0 billion 521.8 billion 32Germany
1007.9 billion 24 9.5 billion 29 32.8 billion15.4 billionTotal 47
Source: Calculated from figures given in John H. Dunning.°
See also Table 2.2 (1914) for comparison.
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Table 2.5
Debtors in 1913 by Continents
Continent /Amount(U.s.$)
Europe (Russia, Central
12 billion 27and Southern Europe)
10.5 billionNorth America
8,5 billionLatin America 19
Asia 6 billion 14
4.7 billionAfrica 11
2.3 billion0 ceania 5
Total 44.0 billion 100




Types of U. K. I s Credit in 1913
Credits
Portfolio (Railway etc.) 40
Government Securities, Social Overhead etc. 30
Utilities 5
Industry,, finance and Commerce 15
Traditional type of Investment (Colonial) 10
Total 100
Source: Calculated from figores given in John H. Dunning. 10 Studies.
%
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for the emergence of direct foeign investment latter.
. The tables 2.7 (inclusive) shows the above points. Tables 2.7
and 2.8 show the international credits and debits in 1938 and Tables 2.9
and 2.10 show the foeign investment (total and direct) standings of
the U.S.
During and after the Second World War, becuase or ine costi oI
the War-on the part of the creditors and the export expansion of the
debtors, total foreign indebtedness was reduced sizeably. As a result
international net obligations fell from 25 billion U.S. dollars to well
under 10 billion dollars and gross investments declined from $55 billions
to between $35 and $40 billions.
However, since the War there was a remarkable resurgence in
international capital movement. Net private long-term capital flow in
the late forties amounted to U.S.$ 1.8 billions per annum. It reached
the peak of $3.5 billion in 1958 and then droped off a bit in the sixties.
(See Table 2.11) More significantly, perhaps, was the flow of official
capital which outweighed private capital in these years (See also
Tables 2.11)
Another phenomenonwhich was unknownto the earlier years was
that manycountries acted both as exporters of capital and at the same
time as _ importers of capital. Thus, the gap between gross foreign
investment and net foreign investment widened.
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Table 2.7
Position of International Credits, 1938
Creditors Amount(U. S. $) /3
United Kingdom 22.9 billion 43
United States 11.5 billion 22
Belgium, Netherland,
and Switzerland 7.7 billion 15
France 3.9 billion 7
Germany 0.7 billion 1
Other Countries 11.6 billion 12
Total 52,8 billion' 100
Source: Calculated from figures given in United Nations publication 11 0
Comparewith Table 2.3
The discrepancy between the total figure given in this Table and
Table 2.8 is due to certain inconsistancies in data reported by
investing and receipant countries.
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Table : 2.8
Position of International Debts, 1938









Source: Calculated from figures given in United Nations publications-
Comparewith Tables 2.4 and 2.5
See footnote in Table 2.7
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Table 2.9
Total U. S. Foreign Investment 1913 - 1938






Source: Calculated from figures given in John H. Dunning.'
35
Table 2.10
U. S. Direct Foreign Investment, 1913-1967
Cumulative







1967 59 billion (estimated)
Source: Calculated from figures given in John H. Dunning.'
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Table 2.11 Net Flow of Long-term Capital and Official Donations from Capital
Exporting Countries 1946 - 64
Official (Donations Private and
Private and Capital Official Together
Total Per Annum Total Per Annum Total VerAnnm
Year U.S.$m. U.S.$m. U.S$m. U.S.$m. U.S.$m.
n. a.n. a.n. a.n. a.1,8291946-50 9,145
22,6452,594 4,5291951-55 12,9709,675 1,935
16,416 4,104 31,1761956-59 14,760 7,7943,690
8,68917,37711,1746,2131960-61 3,106 5,582
?2,73717,4271961-64 1,770 5,809 7,5795,310
2.374 n. a. n. a. n. a.45,103 n. a.1946-64
1951-64 2,568 57,97735.958 4,141 93,935 6,710
Source: The United Nations publications 15
n. a..: Not available.
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Reasons Behind the Historical Facts
From the historical facts we can derive the followings:-
(1 Portfolio investment was the dominant force before the Wars,
(2) Behind portfolio investment was exporting and importing of goods,
(3) Direct foreign investment at first was mostly in the form of trad.
itional (colonial) types of investment.
(4) After the great depression private portfolio investment came to an
end and direct foreign investment emerged,
(5) Official loans from the MDCswere used to finance social overhead
of the LDCs.
In and after the ninteenth century there was relatively
little limitation of trade (and factors of production) and capital
(because of the gold standard. Thus, the world was operating under
the theory of the classical economists. Capital responded to interest
differentials and goods were exported from countries with comparative
economic advantages to those with comparative disadvantages.
At this time it happened that the more developed areas had
the capital (behind it industrial goads) and the less developed areas
needed that capital (and goods) for development. Thus, fixed-interest
bearing bonds were sold by governments and railway companies of the
LDCsto develop social overhead.
38
The NDCsdid not invest in the LDCs all for nothing. They
wanted to eat th:e. cake and still keep the cake. They needed food
and other primary products from the LDCs- which were produced at a
relatively cheaper price in the LDCs. This explained the presence of
the trading companies, and direct investment in the form of colonial
plantations, mines, etc. in the LDCs.
The LDCs could only service the debts (behind them the
industrial goods) by means of their primary products- raw cotton
sugar, coffee, corpa, coppery etc. With the development of the LDCs,
there was a great increases in the production of raw materials and
foodstuff. The highly inelastic demandof these products resulted not
only in a sharp fall in prices but in total dollar exports. In addition,
the development of direct investment to produce industrial goods
caused restrictions to trade. Also the greater proportion of social
overhead investment created no immediate direct income. All these
contributed to the inability of the LDCsto service the portfolio debts
properly.
The direct foreign investment, however, because of being
controled by the hands of the investors, could not be defaulted and,
finally, survived.
They could do this by lending their capital at interest.
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Table 2.12 Direct Foreign Investment of Selectea uouniires
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After World War II Europe was in ruins with a huge market
abd many opportunities but it lacked capital. This tempted the Americans
to rush in and established production points there. In the LDCs,
because of import substitution and export expansion strategies, much
direct capital was attracted.
The emergence of official loans was also something inevitable
in history. The demise of private portfolio investment had to be taken
up by the rich not only to help the poor but to create markets to help
sell the rich's products. Official international loans were the best
answers.
To conclude this section, one thing we can be sure of is the
growth of manufacturing overseas investment.
2.2 The Reasons for Manufacturing Dompanies to Go Abroad.
Direct investment may thus be capital
movement. but it is more than that17.
Basically investment flows reflect differences in rates of
return in the capital importing and the capital exporting countries+
It would seem reasonable to assumethat firms will invest abroad as
long as the marginal rate of return abroad is greater than that at
home(after the discount of risk,
Sometimesa firm may operate at a loss which represents either a short-
run loss but long-run profit or a stage of sub-optimization for the
optimisation of the entire firm.
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In recent years as the NDCsexhaust more of their raw
materials (especially energy), the urgency of the need to develop new
supplies abroad increases. This need or easier procurement of raw
materials or international backward integration explains the
traditional type or colonial type of investment in the tropical or
sub-tropical plantations in the nineteenth century as well as many
American and Western European oil investments nowadays.18.
Certainly, horizontal integration is not a factor less
important than vertical integration. According to some market research
Western Europe represents a market potential of fully 50J of that of the
United States19. Asia and other less developed countries represent
more than two-thirds of the World's population. These are potential
markets. Not only may it be cheaper for a firm to manufacture in a
foreign country than to export to it fear of competition and subsequant
loss of market (in the host country) are also powerful inducements.
The taste, preference, demandof a certain commodity are not exactly
the same in different places. A close-to-market production point is
often preferred for flexibility. Thus, the desire to penetrate new
markets or to protect existing ones from the effects of over-competition
are two of the most commonlystated factors influencing foreign
investment. In recent years-particularly in the case of the United
States- the rate of growth in manufacturing output was generally well
below that in most other countries20.
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Parallel with market expansion is the realization of patents,
technical know-how and other innovations. Developments in capital
intensive technology and the increasing cost of research and development
programmeshave reinforced the need for companies to seek new production
points to spread the costs and realise the benefits of their innovations.
The exploitation of foreign cheaper levels of production is
another factor that contributes to investing abroad. One of the
characteristics of direct foreign investment (espedially in manufacturing
industries) is the flow of capital from MDCsto LDCs. The lower
standards of living in the LDCs give rise to a cheaper supply of raw
materials, land and labour. The elimination of tariffs, transportation
costs etc. also represent a substantial reduction in production cost.
All these invite foreigners to comein.
Economic nationalism has never been so stung as is now.
High tariffs, quotas, discriminary procurement practices, buy-
national policies, anti-dumping practices and even state trading
restrictions are daily headlines. This leads to the seeking of other
outlets instead of trade - foreign direct investment. The import
substitution and export expansion policies, the tax holidays of the
LDCsprovide favourable investment climates and conditions for foreigns
and invite overseas investors to establish factories in the LDCs.
2.3 The Product Cycle Model+
j
Backgroun
The comparative economic advantage theory has been the
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dominating explanation for international trade for two enturies.
Nature(and man) had deceed important and enduring differences between
countries. Someof them are rich in coal, others have fertile plains
and still others have talented humanbeings and know-how. The differences
in factor endowmentaffect the cost of production. Based on this
assumption, a country will tend to export the commodity whose relative
(to other commodity) cost or comparative cost of production is lower
than it is in other country+++.
The product cycle model, infact, explains foreign trade and,
ultimately, foreign direct investment as an alternative for the
classical comparative economic advantage phenomenonand should
therefore be included in section 2.2. Its separation only shows
the suthor's emphasis on this model.
Similar approaches this problem are the opportunity cost theory
(Gottfried Haberler21) and the Heckscher22- Ohlin23theory of
factor-endonment.
For an explanation of the theory, see any Intertional Economics
textbook, e.g. Heller24, Kindleberger25, Snider , etc.
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Table 2.13
Domestic+ Capital and Labour Requirements for Production




$18,184 / man-year$13, 991 / man-yearCapital / Labour
Domestic means the United States
Source: W. Leontief: "Domestic Production and Foreign Trade",
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, September,
1953
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However, Leontief's findings upset the traditional theories.
The father of input-output analysis found out that the United States,
the generally acknowledged most capital abundant country, imports
relatively capital-intensive products and exports relatively labour-
intensive products (See Table 2.13.
Defense of Comparative Advantage Theory
The Leontief paradox cannot upset Ricardo's Comparative
advantage cost model, Haberler's Opportunity Cost theory and
Heckscher-Ohlin's Factor Endonsment explanation so easily. These
theories tell only the forces on the supply side. Should the forces of
demandfor certain goods be so great they may not only counter-act the
advantages of supply, but force the country to import goods that they
have, prime facie, "disadvantages+".
Leontief's study excludes somelabour intensive goods suck
as coffee, jute, tea, etc. that America does not produce. With the
exclusion of these labour-intensive products, the comparison is
naturally biased.
Besides Leontief uses man-year as a unit for comparison.
In the LDCslabourers work twenty-five-hour-day, thirty-two-day month,
thirteen-month year whereas in the ADCsand America the labourers
work muchmuchless per man-year. Besides, figures cheat again in the
comparison of capital. A machine_(or building) that costs one hundred
For a simple explanation, see H. R. Heller 28
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dollars in the States would cost only thirty or forty dollars in
an LDC.29
Economic dualism, perhaps, is another explanation for the
paradox. Libya and Kuwait as a whole lack capital and technology.
Their oil plants are more capital intensive than most American
manufacturing plants. Kuwait exports oil to the States. The United
States sell shirts to Kuwait. Both of them are abiding the factor
endowmentprinciple.
RaymondVernon's Alternative
Following the issue of the Leontief paradox there has been
a flowering in international trade and capital theories. Raymond
Vernon put forward a theory with less emphasis upon comparative cost
and more upon the timing of innovation, the effects of scale economies,
and the roles of ignorance and uncertainty in influencing trade patterns"30
and capital movement.
New Product Stage
Because of the higher incomes and the higher labour costs,
United States producers are likely to be the first to perceive an
opportunity for high-income or labour-saving new products. At this
stage producers........ are particularly concerned with the degree of
freedom they have in changing their inputs. Besides, the price
elasticity of demandfor the output of the individual firm is compara-
tively low32 resulting in a less cost conscious attitude of the
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entrepreneur. Moreover, "The need for swift and effective communication
on the part of the producer with customers, suppliers, and even com-
petitors is especially high at this stage."33 All these considerations
point to a conclusion - the producer who sees a market for some new
product in the United States may be led to select a United States
location for production on the basis of national location considerations
which extend well beyond simple factor cost analysis plus transport
considerations"34.
The Maturing Product Stage
As the demandfor a product expands, "though the sub-
categories may multiply and the efforts at product differentiation
increase, a growing acdeptance of certain general standards seems to be
typical35, This results in a decrease in the need for flexibility,
enabling a commitment to some set of product standards opens up
technical possibilities for achieving economies of scale through mass
output and encourages long-term commitments36
Somehigher income group in other parts of the world may,
at this point, demandthe product. This demandmay be relatively small
in quantity, resulting in some exports to foreign consumers. But as
time goes on, demandincreases. Once the market expands in such an
advanced country, entrepreneurs will consider whether the time has
come to take the risk of setting up local producing facilities37 -
especially in view of cheaper production costs. Thus, foreign
investment begins.
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if Once such an investment is made by a
United States producer, other major pro-
ducers in the United States sometimes see
it a great threat to the status quo. They
see themselves as losing position relative
to the investing company, with vague intimations
of further losses to come. Their 'share of the ma
market' is imperiled, viewing 'share of the
market' in gloval terms. At the same time
their ability to estimate the production-
cost structure of their competitors, operating
far away in an unfamiliar foreign area, is
impaired this is a particularly unsettling
state because it conjures up the possibility of a
return flow of products to the United States
and a new source of price competition ased on costdifferences of unknownedmagnitude. 3
Thus, foreign investments flower.
The Standardised Product
History repeats itself. The story extends to the less
developed countries. Exports will eventually go to them and, as
time goes on, someentrepreneurs will establish their production
points there to exploit the market as well as the still cheaper
production cost.
As the production cost in the LDCsis far below than that
in the I'IDCs, the entrepreneurs will find it profitable to export from
these LDCs. Thus, nineteen out of twenty mortor cycles, sixteen
percent of the automobils and all the radios in the United States
are impobted.
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The model so far has not explained the intensiveness of
capital. A standardised textile factory may be more or less capital-
intensive than a plant for unstandardised petro-chemicals. This model
says tha investment in the LDCs and their exports depend only on whether
there is a market large enough to produce with scale economies and the
product is standardized or not. Capital-intensiveness is immaterial.+
2.4 The Decision to Invest: A Sequential Game't'heory
The general idea of a game is that with which
we are familiar in the context of parlor games.
Starting from a given point, there is a sequence
of personal moves, at each of which one of the
players chooses from amongseveral possibilites
interspersed amongthese there may also be
chance, or random, moves such as throwing a die
or shuffling a deck or cards.
At the end of a game, there is normally some
payoff to the players (in the form of money,
prestige or satisfact q) which depends on the
progress of the game.
Therefore, in our general idea of a game three elements
enter:
(1) Alternation of moves, which can be either personal or randoms
(chance) moves
(2) A possible lack of knowledge and
(3) A payoff function.
In fact when a product is at its earliest stage, less machinery
and more labour would be expected, thus, more labor-intensive
products will be exported by NTDCs.
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" A major criticism of the game theory at
its present stage of development is that even
the most advanced versions are too unrealistic
and simplified to be applied to situations.
which might be encountered in real life."40
An ordinary firm operating in the home economywill face
many problems simultaneously. The president will have to deal with the
problems of raw materials, machinery, distribution, price ...... He will
have to solve all these problems, from cradle to grave, not next year or
even to-morrow, but NOW.The game theory which assumes a single move,
and a single move only is certainly not adequate for the ordinary firm.
On the contrary, a firm investing abroad, though it will
often think of a series of moves overtime, will only make a single move
at each time. This makes the game theory framework useful in foreign
investment. A major reason for making one rather than a series of
moves toward some ideal final solution is that the firm going abroad
wants to buy information overtime. Its ability to predict how its
market, its suppliers, etc. behave, once it it in the market, is
improved over time. It can do a better job of applying probabilities
to the strategies of other players as it gets its feet wet in the in-
going economy. It may conceive of some new strategy, not considered
at the outset, which could be usefully applied.
Sequential GameTheory
Sequential gametheory, still in its infancy, is addressed
to the complicated case of a sequence of movesrather than the single
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move in the game. By sequential game theory, we mean that a firm
trying to invest abroad will not enter a new economywhich it has no
prior relation with or knowledge of by the immediate establishment of
a big production point. This sequential movement is
the process we see at work in the
classic sequence of moves which the firm
makes as it goes from independent dis-
tribution to using its own sales force
in a particular market, or as it goes
from zero production in the country to
use of a licenses, then to a joint-
venture or fully-owned operation."41
Under this theory we can assume that foreign manufacturing
firms represents one of the moves of foreign investment. We can expect
that before the decision of establishing a manufacturing firm in a new
economy, employed an agent, established a sales force, pursued a joint-
venture, etc. Of course, the nature of this progression will vary from
case to case, but it seems apparent that the establishment of a wholly-
ownedforeign manufacturing firm can be viewed as one of the sequence
of moves over time. At each stage the player faces alternation movesq
a lack of knowledge and a payoff function. Each of its previous moves
represents a step towards building up a wholly-owned maufac-uring
companyin the economy, whether this move is buying from or selling
to this economy.
2.5 Costs and Benefits of Foreign Investments
Analysing costs and benefits of foreign investments are no
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easy tasks, We cannot distinguish, like an accountant, what is income
and what is expenditure. An element may be a cost to a certain group,
but a benefit to another. It may be a cost in the short-run, but a
benefit in the long-run. After all, foreign investment is not a zero-
sumgame.
Balance of Payments
Sometimes a foreign investment may bring about balance of
payment problems and the depletion of foreign exchange of the host
country. Foreigners may remit their profits and principals back to
their homecountries without considering the balance of payment
conditions of the host country, resulting in muchembarassment and even
a devaluation.
On the other hand foreign investment in the manufacturing
sector has impact on the balance os payment standing of the host country
too. Emphaseshave been placed on both import subsitution and export
expansion by most less developed countries. This will certainly help
the host country to earn or save foreign exchange remedying the BOP
conditions of the host country and releaving it from the tragedy of
frequant devaluation.
Investment Fund and Capital Formation
Competition from foreign investors may reduces the profit-
ability of the host investors. This in turn may reduce savings of the
host country. Capital formation and economic development may be hindered.
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Should this occurs in the less developed countries, the force will be
esuecially stronr.
Looking from another angle,, foreign investment provides
capital for investment. To achieve a certain predetermined rate of
economics growth the host country then has to obtain an inflow of
foreign private capital to fill the gap of the host country's investing
capital.
However, in reality the provision of funds for investment is
not too important a factor. As
Historical experience seems to show that
a country must first be more or less developed
economically before there is foreign investment,
but foreign investment in plantations etroleum and
mining have been apparent exceptions."42
Thus, when a country is primitive in economic development and the propensity
to save is low, the country needs a lot of fund for investment. At this
time even with all sorts of inducements no foreigners will be willing to
invest in the country. But as soon as the country develops and it has
great saving potential and does not need the funds so badly, foreign
capital rushes in.
Effects of Foreign Investment in EconomicDepartment
The investment policies of foreign investors depend on the
benefits to the parent companies. Their policies may be inconsistant
with those of the host country. Under such a case foreign investment
certainly represents a cost.
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Besides, foreign investors may concentrate in a certain
industry and have absolute control over it. Or they may create an
unbalanced growth resultign in a poor allocation of the host
country's scarce resources.
However, foreign investment, especially in the manufacturing
companies, and may make a great contribution to the national income of
.the host country. A manufacturing companyprovides employment to the
nationals. It utilises the land and factory buildings. It represnets
an establishment of an organisation. Their returns are included in the
national income accounts. Besides, the production of a foreign
manufacturing companyis not the end of the story. It is merely a ring
in the chain. It may stimulate the production of raw materials in the
backward chain. It may also create wholesalerd retailers, transportation
companies, etc. which may also create national income and stimulate
economic development.
Tax Revenue and Provision of Facilities
Somegovernments, in trying to attract foreign investment
offer the holidays and other tax incentives to foreigners. Some
governments go so far as the offer special privileges, such as procidin€
factories, the building of special water supply systems to induce
foreigners to establish firms in their countries. This not only
represent out-of-pocket cost for the host governments, but weakens the
competitive standing of the nationals.
Of course the establishment of a foreign manufacturing
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companywill result an increase in taxation directly and more
imuortant. indirectl.
Opportunity Cost versus External Economy
The most important benefit a foreign manufacturing company
(and any sort of foreign investment) can offer to the host country,
perhaps, is the external economies of the company. Foreign manufacturers
cannot survive and compete with the host investors unless they are more
advanced in technology as well as managerial ability. The external
economies of foreign manufacturing companies-include the fields of new
product and technological innovation diffusion new organisation
structures and administrative processes the training of skilled labour
and managementteams better investment opportunities because of both
backward and forward chains,, etc. Once a manufacturing companyis
established, no one can help stopping the diffusion of the above factors
in the host economy. Once those factors are in the host country, they
are there for good.
Besides, foreign investment, especially in the manufacturing
field, provides more employment opportunities. It is true that most
less development agricultural economies claim full employment. Very
often their full-employment represents a mal-allocation of man-power.
With more foreign investment in the manufacturing sector the redundant
labour can becomeproductive.43
But the host country investors usually are smaller in size,
especially when comparedwith the parent companies of the foreign investors.
59
This makes the host industrialists in a difficult competitive positive
due to the economies of scale.
Foreign manufacturers have better R D supporting their
firms too. They have also better brand names and reputations. Thus,
local producers may have difficulties competing with the invading
manufacturers. Financially, foreign investors are not only well supporte
by parent companies, but can obtain credits more easily, usually on
better terms.
With the above factors and the "infant industry" argument,
foreign manufacturers can dominate the host market, choking the
develoment of host investors.
To conclude this section the author quotes a paragraph from Samuelson:
The readers may recall that the novelist
William Dean Howells has his famous-, title
character Silas Lapham, a rising self-made-
point tycoon, present his partner with the
ultimatum: 'you buy me out or I'll buy you
out.' Silas' two excuses, that his were
the real brains and energy responsible for
the success of the business and that the
profbrred price exceeded his partner's
original investment, were cleverly seen
through by Mrs. Lapham. She pointed out
that, without the partner's moneyat the
critical time, the business could never have
succeeded and that Silas offer to sell was
premised upon the knowledge that his partner
was not in a position to buy the whole business.
11 Thus, the belief that P.O.I. (private overseas investment
may provide the key to this (gap-between per capita incomes in
developed and underdeveloped countries) potential crisis in under-
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development and the argument that P.OI. is merely the twentieth
century refinement or economic outcome of the gun-boat diplomacy of
the imperialist powers of the last century should have their'answer.
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CHAPTERIII
Economics of Wholly-Owned Foreign Manufacturing
Companies in Hong Kong
This is a chapter that is analogous to the previous
chapter. Whereas the previous chapter is concerned with the
general facts of foreign direct investment in the manufacturing
sector, this chapter deals with the specific conditions in the
Colony.
3.1 Historical Facts
Hong Kong started as a base for trade between China and
Europe. It was only an entrepot. This entrepot was a means for
the British to do business with China. Thus, they invested in
trading houses and financial institutions, as well as the necessary
social overhead (e.g. The Port) for the purpose of serving this
entrepot trade.
After 1949, because of a change in the political situation
in Mainland China, there was a sudden inflow of foreign capital,
including both machinery as well as money, transplanted from China
(especially Shanghai. Unlike any other foreign capital, this
inflow of capital remained in Hong Kong and becamepart of Hong
Kong ever since. This inflow provided the necessary funds,
technology as well as machinery for our industrialisation.
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In the sixties Hong Kong saw an inflow of capital from
the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan. They invested
in Hong Kong mainly to exploit the cheap labour of Hong Kong.
During this period foreigners concentrated in producing standardised
products with our cheap labour as well as their huge amount of
capital. Thus, the relative size of the manufacturing companies
were relatively large in terms of investment.
In the late sixties and the seventies Hong Kong had no .
more cheap labour. The foreigners began to look for other things.
They invested in Hong Kong to exploit our quality labour. They did
not look to capital-intensiveness so much. They made use of the
labourers here to produce some differentiated products. Thus we
could see that there was a steady decrease in the size of the
manufacturing companies with foreign capital.
3.2 WhyForeigners Establish Manufacturing Companies in Hong Kong
The baz ,nrock is the fairest description of this barren
rock. It is not endowed with sugar cane, coconuts or cotton. Nor
is it an oil drum. Hong Kong is no answer to international backward
integration. In fact all our raw materials are imported.
Assumption: The raw materials of the foreign manufacturing companies
comemainly from either the parent companies or are procured from the
homemarkets. Backward integration and secure raw material procurement
are not the commonpractices.
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Hong Kong is an export oriented economy with more than
eighty percent of its manufacturing products exported. It is
estimated that foreign manufacturers certainly export an even
larger percentage of their production. Hong Kong has a small
population and a small economywith very low gross domestic pro-
ducts. Neither is Hong Kong a good place to manufacture for the
region. Hong Kong's neighbours are mostly LDC's commandinglittle
purchasing power. Besides, relatively little trade is conducted
between Hong Kong and these places other than MDC's. Hong Kong has
a buy foreign attitude. Foreign made is a symbol for good and
local made equals bad. The expansion of market argument is
false in Hong Kong.
Assumption: Foreign manufacturers do not intend to produce for the
local market or markets in this region. They intend to produce for
their homesmarkets or other markets.
Following the above argument, producing in Hong Kong does
not represent the realisation of patent, innovation, technological
know-how, etc. through producing for the local market or markets in
South East Asia.
Assumption: Though the realisation of patent, innovation, etc. are
important, the extension to this place is not for those purposes or
fulfills those purposes.
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A cheap production level is not a phenomenonof Hong Kong
nowadays. All the raw materials of Hong Kong are imported. The
cost of raw materials should be higher than that in foreign countries
because of the transportation cost involved. Lewis' unlimited supply
of labour certainly does not apply to Hong Kong. Hong Kong has
reached the stage of over-employment. With the inelastic supply of
labour Hong Kong has imported wage inflation from the U-S. and the
U. K., making its wage rank second only to Japan in Asia. Ricardo's
theory of land is tailor-made for Hong Kong. It is estimated that
this free gift of nature in Hong Kong will set a world record. In
addition, the good-transportation network, the absence of import
control and tariffs ++ result little reduction in production cost.
Assumption: Foreigners do not look for the cheapest production
level when establishing manufacturing companies in Hong Kong.
Hong Kong is the last of the classical economists' free
trade abider. It has no tariffs. It imposes no quotas. It adopts
no discriminatory procurement practices.
Rumourssay that the present sites of the General Post Office in
Central will bit up to over $ 17,000 per square foot - a new world
record.
Only very few imported items axe controlled and taxed.
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Hong Kong has little R D. Technology here is com-
paratively low when compared with that in the U. S., the U. K.,
Germany, and so forth.
Thus, if one wants technology, go to America. If one
wants cheap labour, cheap land, go to Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia.
Forget producing for Hong Kong in Hong Kong. Forget trade barriers
goods from entering Hong Kong.
You cannot and will not find an average man. Hong Kong is
Hong Kong. Foreigners open their manufacturing companies in Hong
Kong only because Hong Kong is Hong Kong. The reasons for them to
choose Hong Kong are many and varied. The author, however, wants-to
emphasise the humanaspect.
Hong Kong became a British Crown Colony after the Opium
Wars in the 1840's and Hong Kong becamethe base for Anglo-Chinese
trade. In addition to her excellent natural harbour, the land trans-
portation net-work was built up. This provided the necessary social
overhead for economic development in Hong Kong.
More important, perhaps, was the organisation and know-how
accumulated through the century. Because of the entrepot trade,
Hong Kong had manytrading houses with a pool of skilled employees,
which represented talent that other LDC's did not have. Hong Kong
had the necessary pre-conditions for development.
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The year 1949 represented a critical point for the Colony.
The emergence of the communists and the subsequant blockade by the
10
Americans killed Hong Kong's position as an entrepot. Hong Kong had
to look for other means to survive.
In 1949 and the subsequant years Hong Kong saw a flood of
immigrants from China. The immigrants could be classified into two
categories: the mass of people who came mainly from Kwuntung and
those who came from Shanghai.
The sudden increase of the mass of people made the Arthur
Lewis Model of development work. Especially because of this barren
rock the subsistance sector here was relatively small, making the
marginal productivity of the sector equal to zero. This meant that
any wage. that was above the subsistence level was enough to attract
an unlimited supply of labour. Not only was labour cheap and
abundant, the quality was relatively good. The people who left China
left some of their traditional cultural background in China. They
had to give up their usual way of living. However, in order to
survive they had to retain their industrous nature. Besides, it was
not a surprise that those who came to Hong Kong represented the cream
of the nation. They were relatively better educated, more aggressive
and more adaptive.
There came also the Shanghaiese with their machinery, know-
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how and technology transplanted from Shanghai. This great leap in
capital formation, which could not be explained by any development
model, shifted the marginal productivity of labour greatly upward.
Their talent with their capital in addition to the plentiful supply
of good, cheap labour made possible the rapid development of the
capitalistic sector of Hong Kong.
W. A. Lewis (like all other economists) was bound to over-
look something in his model, but Hong Kong did not. With the trading
talent developed through years, Hong Kong had not only the cheap
labourers and the manufacturers, but also the persons who could sell
the products.
Thus, in this period the Hong Kong economywas based on the
manufacturing of mass products (mainly textiles) that required plenty
of cheap labour and competed on the basis of price.
In 1964 and 1965 Hong Kong experienced a boom. Although
Hong Kong had the bank crisis in 1965 and the riots in 1967, never-
theless, she recovered from the shocks quickly and in 1968 Hong Kong
saw a re-emergence of investment. (See Table 3.1)
During these years HongKonghad certainly reached ana.
passed the commercialisation point and it was beyond the scope of
the Lewis Model to explain the situations of Hong Kong. Labour
was redundant no more and neither was land. As time went on, labour
becamemore and more scarce and becamemore and more expensive.
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Naturally Hong Kong cannot now compete with Taiwan, Indonesia
and Korea in providing cheap and plentiful labour. Neither can it
compete with the MDC's in labour productivity. However, not only have
the capitalists here learned to produce quality products and adopted
better processes from contacting with foreigners, the workers have
changed their working habits and attitudes. More higher skilled,
better-trained workers are willing to work in factories. The adaptive-
ness of these people make it mucheasier for them to take up new jobs
as well as difficult jobs. This quality is something that the
Indonesian worker or the Korean workers do not process. A foreigner
with a brand new idea can come to Hong Kong and get a team of workers
to work for him readily. These workers, though not as cheap as the
Koreans, the Indonesians and the Taiwanese, are muchcheaper than the
Americans and the Europeans. However, their ability equals that of
the Americans and Europeans, and is unmatchable by the Indonesians.
This pool of adaptable, teachable labour enables foreigners to invest
here and make a good profit.
Assumption: Foreign manufacturers come to Hong Kong to find adaptable,
teachable workers that are not present in other cheap labour areas and
are not available at such a low price in the MDC's.
3.3 Product Cycle Model in Hong Kong
Direct investment is a subject in which
it is necessary to judge case by case, 1
on the basis of relevant circumstances.
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Table 3.1
Capital Formation 1960 - 1970













Source: 1960 N. Owen: The Decline of Competition with Industry
Maturity: The Implication for Income Distribution
in Hong Kong, Centre of Asian Studies Working Paper,
University of Hong Kong, 1971.
1961 - 70 Estimated by author from data given by Census and
Statistics Department, Hong Kong.
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Professor RaymondVernon says that United States producers
are likely to be the first to spy an opportunity for high-income or
labour-saving new products2 because the United States market offers
certain unique kinds of opportunities to those who are in a position
to be aware of them3.
First, the United States market consists of
consumers with an average income which is higher
(except for a few anomalies like Kuwait) than
that in other national markets, twice as high as
that of Western Europe, for instance. Wherever
there was a chance to offer a new product
responsive to wants at high levels of income, this
chance would presumably first be apparant to some-
one in a position to observe the United States
market.
Second, the United States market is
characterized by high unit labor costs and
relatively unrationed capital compared with
practically all other markets. This is a fact
which conditions the demandfor both consumer
goods and industrial products. In the case of
consumer goods, for instance the high cost of
laundresses contributes to the origins of drip-
dry shirt and the home washing machine. In the
case of industrial goods, high labor cost leads
to the early development and use of the conveyor
belt, the fork-lift truck and the automatic
control system. It seems to follow that wherever
there was a chance successfully to sell a new
product responsible to the need to conserve labor,
thischancewouldbeapparentfirstto thosein a positiont observetheUnitedStatesmarket.
Following this line of argument, we can say that different
environments will result in the production of different goods. Since
Hong Kong is an export-oriented economyand local citizens have a
buy-foreign inclination, we can ignore the demandside of the
situation.
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As we have mentioned in the previous discussions of the
characteristics of Hong Kong, we can conclude that Hong Kong is a small
economywhich has not only imported full-employment (or, more exactly,
over-employment), but inflation its factor costs (especially labour
and land) are higher than other LDC's it has limited no ability to
develop high technological innovations and its people are more
adaptable and teacheable than other foreigners.
The smallness of its economy and the subsequent lack of R D
and the merely moderately high labour cost do not provide good incentives
for the development of original new products. Neither are its income
level or market size attractive for mature products to be produced here.
Beyond the Standardised Products: the Differentiated Standardised
Products
Hong Kong has been continuously in contact with all parts of
the world. It has been producing for the rest of the world for more
than a century. Thus, Hong Kong has a better opportunity to sense what
the world needs better than any other parts of the world can. It can
smell the needs of the NDC' s .
Thus, though Hong Kong cannot afford R D for original
technological innovation, Hong Kong cannot compete with the NDC's in
producing mature products and though Hong Kong cannot compete with the
LDC's in producing standardised products, her shortage of labour, high
wages, capital availability, and supply of intelligent and adaptive
labour stimulate it to modify the standardised products. In the case
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of consumer goods, for instance, Hong Kong does not merely produce
standardised shirts, but highly fashionable shirts not merely radio
sets, but eye-pleasing radio sets. In the case of industrial goods it
produces not only metal electro-plated products, but plastic electro-
plated products. 9
Though the rtDC's can produce them all, Hong Kong can produce
them much more cheaply. Although the NDC's can produce what we can
produce, we can produce them much more cheaply. Despite cheaper
production levels, the LDC's cannot produce what we produce.
Assumption: The wholly-owned Foreign manufacturing companies in Hong
Kong cannot produce new, original products. Nor are they merely pro-
ducing standardised products. They produce differentiated standardised
products.
3.4 HowForeign Manufacturers Decide to Invest in Hong Kong
In the fourth section of the previous chapter we have dis-
cussed how a person behaves when he invests abroad. On the whole, the
sequential gametheory is true when a person goes to any foreign place.
Thus, we can expect that the same sequential gametheory applies in
HongKong.
However, because Hong Kong has built up its reputation
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through time, we should expect foreigners to be more willing to invest
in HonKonsr.. than in manyother LDC' s.
Assumption: Foreign manufacturers tend to buy information over time.
While we believe this phenomenonis true in Hong Kong, we think foreign
manufacturing companies in Hong Kong are more ready to venture into full-
scale operations.
3.5 The Costs and Benefits of Foreign Manufacturing Companies to
Hong Kong
The lack of suitable economic data makes cost and benefit
analysis concerning foreign investment in the manufacturing sector
especially difficult.
Balance of Payments consideration
Foreign manufacturing companies import the necessary capital
for the operation. This represent a significant contribution to the
balance of payments position of the Colony. Besides, their establishment
may absorb local capital (or idle money) preventing capital outflow.
Moreover, their production is mostly exported to other countries,
earning foreign exchange for Hong Kong.
However, they adopt a policy of purchasing from parent companies
as muchas possible. This may increase import demandand balance of
payments pressure. In the long run earnixigs, royalties, managementfees,
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etc. may amount to a huge amount which drain Hong Kong's foreign ex-
change.
While both arguments are true, we can say tnat Hong Kong
exports a lot and Hong Kong imports a lot (see Table 3.2). Thus, we
can say the balance of payments effect is not particularly important
in Hong Kong.
Assumption: Wholly-owned foreign manufacturing companies in Hong Kong
contribute to our trade balance as well as our balance of payments.
However, their contribution is not very significant.
Investment Funds and Capital Formation
Foreign manufacturing companies do provide long-term investment
capital and help Hong Kong in capital formation. This is not an
important factor in Hong Kong because Hong Kong now has the necessary
capital.
Since Hong Kong has always been competing with other countries
in foreign markets, the establishment of foreign manufacturing companies
in Hong Kong would have little effect in our profits, savings and
capital formation.
Assumption: The provision of investment funds by the wholly-owned foreign
manufacturing companies in Hong Kong is not an important benefit for the
development of Hong Kong. At the same time the presence of foreigners
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Table 3.2







0.3750.3015 Beverage and Tobacco
0.5480.3466 Textiles - Cotton
0.657 0°7147 Textiles - Non-cotton
0.3590.1618 Textiles - Misc.
0.4420.3549 Footwear
0.4840.35510 Clothing - Cotton





0.37816 Non-Metal Mineral 0.277
0.60717 Base Metal 0.499
18 Metal Product 0.4430.370
19 Machinery 0.3780.277















Source: EconomicsDepartment, the University of Hong Kong.
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does not represent a decrease in savings and capital formation on The
part of local-investors.
Effects of Foreign Investment in Economic Development
The establishment of foreign manufacturing companies represents
the production of physical goods, the provision of employment
opportunities and real capital formation. All these add to our national
income. However, there is no reason to believe that we cannot produce
the goods, employ the workers and establish the factories. We cannot
over emphasis their importance.
At the same time Hong Kong is under the mercy of the in-
visible hand. The Government is not interfering with what the
entrepreneurs do. The wholly-owned foreign manufacturing companies
cannot operate against our economic policy.
A_ ti on_ The effects of foreign manufacturers in Hong Kong are not
important in our economic development.
Opportunity Cost and External Economy
Foreigners in Hong Kong have absorbed the few of Hong Kong's
talents which can be used by local investors. The factories they
occupy, the roads and highways they jam, to mention a few examples, are
deeply felt by Hong Kong people. All these can be used by local people
for their benefits. This is a very important cost nowadays in Hong
Kong.
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On the other hand it is well known that Hong Kong has very
little R D. It is also known that we are not lagging behind in
technology. With the establishment of foreign manufacturing companies
in Hong Kong, new products, technical experts as well as new technology,
are transfered simultaneously in a package. Though the process of
immitation and competition this whole set of technology is diffused out
all over Hong Kong.
Assumption: The transfer of technology is the most important benefit
that foreigners contribute to Hong Kong. The opportunity cost due to
their presence cannot be neglected.
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The study included library and desk research, preparatory
work for the study, questionnaires personal interviews and follow
up.
4.1 Library Research
Library work refers to extracting information from books,
periodicals, manuscripts, etc. that is related to the field of study,
Whereas there are too many materials written in the field in other
parts of the world little, if any, is written in Hong Kong or about
Hong Kong. As the literature reviewed is either indicated in the
previous two chapters or listed in the bibliography, the author has no
intention to repeat it here.
The library work provided the conceptual framework and the
reasoning of the study. Besides, it provided information about Hong
Kong as a whole.
4.2 Preparation for the Sending out of Questionnaires
Although the number of foreign manufacturing companies
Dperating in Hong Kong is given by the Department of Commerceand
Industry's The Industrial Survery Report of the Industrial Survery
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No. 7 and the subsequant up-datings' , the list of names and
addresses of these companies has not been supplied. The Department
of Commerceand Industry is the only organisation that has the list
and considers itself to be in the best position to help. However,
the official at the Industrial Development Branch refused to supply
any information what-so-ever, It was not before more than three
month's effort that the author could obtain an incomplete list from
another branch of the Department which was proved to be of little value.
After the failure to obtain any information from the
Department of Commerceand Industry, various means were attempted to
obtain the list and other information.
Letters and visits were paid to the consulate generals, trade
commissions or other representatives of those countries that had
wholly-owned manufacturing companies in Hong Kong for the list and
other information. The result, however, was unsatisfactory either
because some did not border to reply or some did not have the
informationo It must be remarked that those responded showed great
interest in the project and were very co-operative.
Table 4.1 Results of Enquires to the Consulates
Letters sent out 16T
Replies received 9
Percentage ( % ) 56.25
Visits 2
One country, Tanzania, had no representative in Hong Kong, therefore
no letter was sent.
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Besides, letters were sent and visits were paid to other
related organisations, including the Hong Kong Trade Development
Council, the Hong Kong Federation of Industries, the Hong Kong
General Chamber of Commerce, the General Chamber of Commerce, etc.
All of them were very helpful and provided a great deal of information,
except for the list, which none of them had.
After the sending out of the questionnaires according to the
list supplied by the Department of Commerceand Industry and the
different consulates, it was found that the response rate was
extremely poor. Therefore, questionnaires were again sent out
according to the lists of names and addresses given in the Japanese
Consulate's Survey on Japanese Investment in Hong Kong and the
American Consulate's American Firms, Subsidiaries and Affiliates,
Hong Kong - 1972 and other sources+.
4.3 questionnaires and Interviews
The questionnaire survey was undertaken from January, 1973
to March, 1973. The questionnaire form (See Appendix I) together
with covering letter (Appendix II) and the return slip (Appendix III)
Were sent out for information.
Other sources included a list supplied by the Department of Commerce
and Industry supplied to a foreign inquiry.
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The slip and the covering letter promised a copy of the
summary of the study when the study was completed. It was believed
that the participants should have the privilege of knowing the
finding of the study. After all, the study could fulfill its purpose
only if it was known to the parties concerned. Besides, it was hoped
that it might stimulate a good response. It also consisted of a
request for a personal interview so as to enable a more detailed study.
After the questionnaires were mailed for some time telephone
calls were made to certain companies to ask for co-operation.
In the survey a total of one hundred and twenty-five sets of
questionnaires were mailed. The sources of mailing addresses were the
Department of Commerceand Industry, the Consulates, the list from the
Japanese, the list from the Americans and others. The details are
given in Table 4.2.
The results of the responses of the questionnaires were
shown in Table 4.3. The explanation for the addition of and others
in the item No Responses and Others is that twelve companies said
that they have completed the questionnaires in the return slip. The
response rate of 8.8 % was low by any standard. Perhaps it could be
attributed to the fact that quite a large portion of the firms on the
list supplied by the Department of Commerceand Industry were not
wholly-owned foreign manufacturing companies. Although only 4% of the
returned letters said so, it was believed that most others would just




Number ofSource of Mailing
LettersAddresses*






The questionnaires would be mailed only once even though there




8.80Returned and Properly 11
Fillout
Incorrect Address 15 12.00
Not in Category 4,005
No Response or others 75.2094
Total 125 100.00
12 slips were received.
%
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Amongthe twelve returned slips (representing the responded
questionnaires) it seemed that the American firms were more readily to
respond as is indicated in Table 4.4 .
The ResponsesTable 4.4
d) = C)/(b) X 100(o)b`.(a)
PercentageResponsesLetters MailedSource
6.41D. C. I 78 5
0.00vConsulates 3





The personal interviews were intended as a means of making a
depth study of the companies concerned. It was believed that some
information could not be asked and answered clearly by short
questionnaires. The interviews were to remedy this short coming.
Amongthe twelve returned slips, five of them were willing to
have chosen discussions. Most of them were American firms (See Table 4.5).
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4.5 Follow-Ups
In order to supplement some items not shown in the
questionnaires and unwilling to be supplied by the interviewers,
follow-up actions .-were taken.
Various commercial directories were examined to double check
the findings. Other information was collected from records of the
CompanyRegistrar General's Department.
Table 4.5 The Interviews
,d) _ (, (b) X 100(a) (c)(b)
PercentageLetters Mailed InterviewsSource





Total 125 5 4
4.6 Limitations
The most serious problem or limitation encountered was the
non-cooperative attitude of the Department of Commerceand Industry.
The poor response on the part of the companies was another problem.
It was deemedthat Hong Kong businessmen were not very willing to
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disclose their operating conditions. Still others adopted the not-
my-business attitude that hindered this (and other) study.
These two limitations together with other problems certainly
presented great difficulties in persuing the study and resulted most
probably a biased study. However, it is hoped that the in-depth
study enabled by the personal interviews and the secondary data obtained
might remedy the seriousness of the problem.
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CHAPTERV
A Bird's Eyeview on the Foreign-Owned
Manufacturing Companies in Hong Kong
The Chapter aims at assessing the extent and ford
of evaluating the contribution, finding out the relative
importance of foreign investment in the manufacturing industries
in Hong Kong and their importance to the local economy.
This analysis of the aggregate information concerning the
capital structure, employment, production and cbveloprtient
trends in foreign investment sector of the industry is intended
to illustrate the importance of overseas participation in
local manufacturing and to provide information for potential
foreign investors to fully assess the opportunities prevailing
in Hong i ong.
The main source of this analysis comes from the
Industry Surve Report of the Coitimerce and Industry Departrlen(1)
It is supp]ei ented and up-dated by the memorandumfor the Trade
and Industry Advisory Board(2) and subseuant i iaterials(3) .
Although the study is concerned vainly with wholly-
owned, f oreign manufacturing companies in Hong Kong, the lack
of disag regate data required the author has to be content with
the analysis of both the solely-owned and the joint ventures
in the field.
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5.1. Some Characteristics of Foreign Investment in the
Manufacturing industries.
mhnrn f ',rta1 i shments
At the end of May, 1970 the number of manufacturing
establishments with foreign interests had reached 161, the
number increased rapidly to 223 at the end of April, 1971
and to 242 in September, 1972.
The number of factories with foreign interests
established annually increased steadily during the early
sixties, climbing to a peak in 1963. Since 1963 there has
been a gradual decline in the number of such factories extablished.
However, in and after 1969 there was a resurgence in the number
of new establishments attaining the highest . total (243) at
the end of 1971. At the end of April, 1971 there were 223
factories with foreign capital. For the next year ( April,
1971 - April, 1972 ) there was an establishment of twenty-
five such factories. But during the same period, eighteen
of them ceased operation. The position on 29th September,
1972+ was that Hong Long had 242 foreign owned factories.
( See Table 5.1 )
For the same period the total manufacturing
establishments in Hong Kong rose from 4784 ( 1960 ) to
17,39 (1970) with an average compound rate of growth of
higher than 155/o ( see Table 5.2 )
+ The most up-to-date data known to the author.
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During this decade the percentage of foreign factories
increased steadily from 0.5% in 1960 to higher than 1% in the
late sixties. ( see Table 5,2 ) . vre can say that foreign
manufacturing companies are assuming a more important role in
the development of Hong Kong. This increase in the proportion
of investment represented an increase in production, employament,etc.
However, the figures also hinted that the foreigners
are exploiting the scarce resources of Hong Kong. During the
earlier days, when Hong Kong was less developed and badly
in need of foreign capital, foreigners were less willing to
come here. As soon as we became developed and experienced
more or less achieved full-employment, and had a good infra-
structure, trained labour, the foreigners rushed in.
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''table 5.1.
Number of Factories With Foreign Interest
Year No. Established Afire gate No. Growth Rate(io)














At the end of May, 1970,




Note : The figures supplied in this Table are certainly
liased. The reason is that foreign companies
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ita a ly •16.8417 , 23970 2,485
source : 1960 - 1967 Hong li:oiltat,istics
1967 - 1970 I-long Kona Industries and Investa-ient 71%72 •
4 5
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Though the number of new manufacturing firms being
established in the Colony was large, the number of manufacturing
companies ceased to be classified as " foreign-owned" was by
no means small. The period between May,19?1 and Oarch,1972
Hong Kong saw eighteen manufacturing firms be deleted from
the category of foreign-owned manufacturing companies. Among
them firms had their foreign partners relinquieshed their
interests and the firms were Iilocalised.
Most of these foreign owned manufacturing companies
had American interests, followed by the Japanese and the British.
However, at the beginning of last decade the Japanese were out
of the scene.
Before 1960 the U.S. had fifteen firciis and the U.K.
had six, making an aggregate of twnety-one +. Thus, at the
time the U. 7. and the were duopolies in foreign manufacturing
industries in Hong Kong. ( see Table 5.3 ). On the whole we can
say that the American investors are steady cohers. The number
of establishrnents in Hong rong shows a steady upward trend.
Another interesting Fact about foreign establishments
is that when most foreigners came to Hong Kong ( 1963-64 ) the
U.S. new establishments declined. However, in the troubled
years when the total number of new foreign factories droned,
) .the number of new U.S. firms remained high ( 1967 and 68
This fact perhaps can be explained by the experience gained by
the Americans through years of operation in Hong Kong, enabling
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Table 5.3.
The U.S. and the U.K. Investment in the i'.:anufacturing Sector
of Hong Kong.
I NV?rBE OFpY1 V1',::1Tljftl.i1. - CC}1Pi1}tillIES
U ^1
.is . L.S. andV *soYear














1 4 ?321()13 1141971
1 3 21321s114 1stotal 114
Source : ppendix VI
U.E.
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them to have a better understanding of the economy. This fact
fits in
certainly, the author's assumption concerning decision. They
had better knowledge of Hong Kong a long period of time. They
could make better estimates of ilong1ong's future prospects.
Types of Foreign Investment in the I'vianufacturing Industries.
Of the 161 foreign-owned factories,ninety-one of thew
were fully-owned and seventy were joint ventures at the end of
May, 1970. In September, 1972 the number of established fully-
owned by foreigners amounted to around 120 with more or less
the same number of joint ventures. ( see Appendix VI ).
The fast increase in the number of joint ventures
especially when compared the wholly-owned foreign manufacturing
companies indicates that, in entering a new market, foreigners
tend to be more cautious and will only go step by step. Again
this hints the validity of the sequential game theory. They
do not only want a marriage certificate they consider the
way to divorce too.
The conditions of the three major foreign investors
in the manufacturing industries in 'long houg behaved similarly.
(see Table 5.4). Their 138 companies ( May,1970 ) consisted
of eighty-one (59%) wholly-owned and fifty-seven (410%0) Joint
ventures. The 190 factories in September, 1972 consisted of
one hundred (530,x) wholly-owned companies. Their growth rates
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were 23% for wholly-owned companies and 58% for joint ventures.
The US. had not only the most wholly-owned factories,
but the highest proportion of the foreign-owned manufacturing
companies in Hong Kong. In the case of joint ventures, the
Japanese had not only the highest proportion, but the largest
absolute number as well. This is because the Americans have
had much experience in Hong Kong through the years. Their
ability to predict conditions in Hong Kong and run better
businesses here are higher. Thus, it is not surprising that
a higher proportion of their establishments represent the
final stage of the game - wholly-owned manufacturing companies.
The British, though owners of this piece of land, rank only
second in this race. The chief reason is tat the long-established
firms in !long Kong have ceased to consider themselves foreign
(See Chapter 1). The new-comers are by no weans compatible
counterparts of the americans. The Japanese, though neighbours
of Hong Kong, represent new-comers not only in Hong Kong but
in international business as a whole. Thus, it can be exp: cted
that they would persue joint ventures rather than starting wholly-
owned manufacturing companies right away.
Time series data can prove and be explained by the
sequential decision theory too. At the end of May, 1970 the
total number of manufacturing establish.ients with entire foreign
interest outweighted those with partial interest with a ratio
Df 1.3 (91 : 70). However, within sixteen months' time the ratio
dropfed to approximately unity. The Japanese's wholly-owned factories
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Table 5.4 Number of Manufacturing Establishments in Hong
Kong (3 Major Investors
31st May,1970 19th Seteniber,1972
Joint-Venture TotalJoint-Venture iotal Fully-OwnedF'ully-Owned
Number of Establishments
U.s. 111(100)77(69) 34(31)82(100)21 (26)61 (74)
57(100)42(74)15(26)41(100)28 (68)13 (32)Japan















Note: Figures in bracket represent percentage.
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dropped from 32 to 26%. Even thei'old handy' drol, ed from 4% to
691/1,0. The new Hong long - Japanese partnerships accrued to
nearly 90% of the Japanese ventures. These figures point to
one fact - new foreign vertures are likely to be in forri of
joint-ventures because all new-corers want to buy information
over time. We have no figures here showing whether these foreign
partners have been trading with Hong hoilg in the past or not.
Besides, we have no knowledge whether the increase in the nuillber
of factories with entire foreign capital represented a further
step after joint-venture. However, findings of the study (see
next chapter) indicate those are the facts.
This analysis to a large extend can be used to prove
the sequential gaiie theory ( See Chapter 2 Section 2.4. and
Chapter 3 Section 3.4 ).
The Sizes of. Foreign Invest,uent
The total investL:lent by foreigners fluctuated over the
)eriod considered. The amount invested in Hong Kong depended
vainly on the general economic conditions of the Colony. The
2mount totaled to Ii.K. 135.8 million in 1964 and 87.7 million
in 1965 when Hong Kong experienced a boom. On the whole, in
recent years, though quite a number of new fires were established,
the new investment declined. This was not only true on per
factory basis, but on total amount ( see table 5.5 ).
In the case of the united States and the United Kingdom
Table 5.6 •) conditions were lust the samie. Thy too had less
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new investment in Hong Kong and the average sizes of each firm
droned to a very low level
'There may be two explanatioW for this. One is that
smaller firms are corning to Hong long and the other is that they
instead of financing their operations from home, they ifrrow
front the local capital market. The smaller firms can survive
in a. foreign country only if they have some qualities unavailable
to others h). They, perhaps, possess some know-how, managerial
ability. and so forth.
In the early sixties and even in the fifties, Hong
Kong started to develop. This offered opportunities for all
- including foreigners. At this stage, though the propensity
to save increased, the demand for investment funds was also high.
Hong Kong needed every dollar she could get hold of. Thus, at
this stage, foreigners offered what they had and what i-Ion Kong
did not have - money.
After 1965 Hong Kong had more or less full employment.
Thus, like in almost all countries periods of rapid economic
development have been associated with rising prices, or at
least with inflationary tendencies iiong 1-:Ong could no longer
compete on price alone. It was time along Kong switched from
producing standardised Products to something new for survival.
The smaller sizes of the foreign manufacturing companies and
their abilities to survive that they can offer Hong Kong something
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Table 5.5.
Forein Investment in the manufacturing Sector in Hong Kong.
d)m(c)(b)(a)



















ite U.S. and the U.I. Investment in the Manufacturing Section
i HongKong.
(f)(e)(b) (c) (d)=(c)/(b) ()=(f)/(e)(1
investmentFirms Investsient Fir insoize Size
ar (tire MILLION)01.',N i11ion)(loo. ) (il•iillion) (II:) (No.)
631.22 43.26151^e 1960 23.882,08
460 10.07 2.52
4 4.9161 19.63 3 8.71 2 0 9 0
78.569i2 8.73 4.854.8 51
5 4.0663 20.30
764 3.9327.48
1 ?.0172.36 2.016.5865 11
0.2366 0.236 4.29 125.74
67 10 0.15 0.1519.81 1.98 1
().1168 8 25. 32) 3.16 0.111
3.19 0.18 0.1936' 0.0618
70 14 0.253.5




new products, technology, etc., that Hong Kong did not have
( See Sections 2.5 and 3.5 )
Participating Countries
The United estates, Japan and the United Kingdom are the
main sources of foreign investiarent in the manufacturing industries
in Hong Kong both in number of establishments and in the value
of investment. In May, 1970 the Americans had full or partial
interests in eighty-two factories followed by the Japanese with
forty-one and the British with fifteen. In September, 1972
their nuiiibers were 111, 57 and 22 respectively. They represented
over ninety percent of the total number of foreign manufacturing
companies in llong Kong.
Other wain sources of foreign investment include
Australia, Switze:Cland, Germany, the Netherlands, Indonesia,
etc. ( See Table 5.7 )
Areas of Interest of Foreign 1Ianuafactures.
The industries with direct foreign capital participation
are textile, electironics, hair products, watches accessories,
metal ,)rouucts and others.
In the early sixties most foreigners ( 60% of the
the factories ) were interested in textiles, plastics and metal-
warese however, by 1965 the electronic industry emerged and is
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Table 5.7
Countries Participating in Hong Kong Manufacturing Industries
Number of Establishments atCountry
























Sources: Appendix VII, Appendix VIII e ANDeVcomlani es have wore than one
Note: 'etinteees. total becabu's_
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Table 5.8
New Foreign Factories: May, 1971- --pri1,1972
Industry/Products No.of Firms Total Investment Sources of Overseas
II.K.p.nni11ion) Investment
Textile-garments 5 12.70 U.S.A.Australia,
Tanzania
Textile-yarns
fabrics 4 89.00 Japan, U.S.A.
Britain
Electronics 3 2.60 U.S.A. Japan
Hairproducts 3 10.30 U.6 .IA., ndonesia,
Taiwan.
Textile made ups 2 1.60 U
Electrical Products r 1.10 U.._. ,.{zerriany
,datches/clocks 4.002 Japan, Switzerlanc
Optics/photographi eA L8.001 U .u.A.




Source : Commerceand Industry 'Department : IN-Mermorandur.i for
the Trade and Advisory board ,A report on the
i'rogree of Foreign Investment in Hong Kong Industry,
13th April,1972.
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now the most important industry. In the late sixties the wigs
industry flowered and with the turn of the seventies watches
came into the scene.
In analysing the recently established foreign
manufacturing companies we can say that all of them produce
standardised products. However our standardised products are
by no means so very Lluch standardised. For example, in the
field of garments Hong Kong has ceased to produce merely dothes.
Any person who cares to glance through any local newspaper would
know that I1ong Kong produces highly fashionable garments for
the world market. These fashions are unknown to the Koreans,
or the Indonesians and Parris cannot produce them as cheaply
as we can.
From Table 5.8 we can find out that there was a
resurge of the gartment industry. Electronics and electrical
products were important too. Other new factories included
watches and clocks, optics and photographics, etc. As is mentioned
earlier the garcents Hong long produce need not only good
designers but skilled workers who can learn fast and produce
fast so that when the products are exported they would not be
obsolete. ,Watches, etc. can only be produced by highly teachable
workers. This shows the adaptiveness of our workers.
Investment by Industry
Industry-wise foreign investment concentrates in the
electronics industry. The 41 factories in the electronics
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industry had an investment of 'l3.K.$247 million ( 30% of total
foreign investment ) . The textiles rey}resented a H.K'.$156
million ( 19% ) investment. The ship-breaking/repairing and
steel rolling industry commandedH . K. 115 million ( 14% ),
the tobacco had n.K.$88 million ( 11% ) and the plastic industry
had H.K. 05 million ( 4% ). ( See Appendix 1X )
The sizes of investment Per factory varies greatly.
The biggest are the tobacco factories with az average size of
$68.90 million. The smallest aretthe handicraft, hair products
and optical industries with less than one million per factory.
5.2 Capital Structure of Foreign Y'Aanufacturing Corn,,sanies
Fixed Capital
The sizes of foreign manufacturing coii_panies in terms
of fixed capital vary and distrbute rather evenly ( slightly
skewed to the smaller sizes ). ( See 'able 5.9 ).
The Annually new real capital accu+iulation by the
foreign manufacturing companies seewed to be decreasing. The
average real capital per factory decreased remarkably over the
years reviewed. Besides, the real capital/total investment r :tio
seemed to decrease too. ( See Table 5.10 )
Comparing with Hong long as a whole, foreiL.,n manufacturing
companies seemed to be more labour-intensive as the real capital
per worker of the foreign firms was lower ( See Table 5.11 ) .
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Table 5.9
Division of Factories by size of Fixed Capital sets
Fixed Capital Investment
No.of Firms AccumulatedRange ( at Original Cost )
72 15$500,000 and below 45
70 43 88500,001 - 5,000,000
19 12 1005,000,00a and above
Total 161 100 100
Source: Appendix X
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Foreigners contributed to about 6% of Hong Kong's fixed capital
in the manufacturing sector. ( See Table 5.12 )
From the above f acts we can derive
(1) The foreigners provide only a small percentage of Bong Kong's
capital. Thus, their presence is not a significant factor
to the provision of funds for capital formation.
(2) Both capital accumiation and technical change, as well
as labour productivity and capital accumulation in Hong
Kong are only weakly correlated. (8) ( The explanation is
that a large part of the wain from technology embodied
in capital accumulation has to be used to offset the over-
utilization and misallocation of capital in the manufacturing
c
sector of Bong Kong 9) ) Thus, the lower proportion
of real capital employed u-:iay represent a better allocation
of resources by the foreigners.
5.3 Ei,iployment '-%onditions
In the middle of 1970 the 161 factories with foreign
interest together em,-Joyed a total of ,iore than fifty-five
thousand workers representing 9.5% of the total number of :.ndu_.trfaJ.
workers recorded by the Labour Departiiient.
Over the period of ten years the workers employed by
those factories increased from 11,630 ( 1960 ) to 54,990 ( 1970
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Table 5.10
Capital Structure of Foreign Manufacturing Companies
1n(a) (c) (d)=(c)/(b) (e)
Real Capital/
Year No.of Factories meal Capital( fIK$m) InvestmentAverage(U(K5111)
Pre 19 60 20 45.58 2.28 22
60 5 65.53 13.11. 213
61 26.1310 2.61 47
62 49.80 3.84 4713
63 19 22.05 1.16 38
64 92.6-018 5.15 6
65 48.73 3.0416 55
66 3813 21.66 1.67
00.4367 5.5613 .6
0.8468 13 10.98 35
69 0.7015 10.52 51
70 0.096 0.59 30






(a) (b) (c) (d)= (b)/(c)
WorkersYear Areate Real Capital/man (5')
Capital (. III(.m)














Workers Capital/man( )Capital (IIK$m)
7,730228,92917701960
9 , 19 0229 , 84161 2114
9,05062 278,5932524





68 6510 507,000 12,830
7250 562 , 00069 12,900
70 9392 15,910590,000
source: Estimated from Hong bong Governoinent Publications.
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Table 5.12
(a) (b) (c) (d)=(c)/(b)
Year Real Capital in along Foreign Real Capital












Source : istiunated from Hong Kong Government Publications.
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representing a 373% increase. This increase also represented
an average growth rate of about 20% perear,
The employment opportunites offered by such coral an i'es
increased steadily when comparing with the entire industrial
employment in Tong Kong. ( See Table 5.13 )
Employment by Industry
In 1970 industry-wise the electronics industry was
the lagest employer of labour taking 25,092 persons ( 46% ) of
all workers in factories with foreign interest. The textile
industry ranked second with a total. of 9,009 ( 16%) followed
by the plastics with 51171 ( 90/0. ( See Appendix XII )
The expatriate working force was rather large with a
total of 415. The industries with most expatriates (in 1970)
were electronics and textiles with over a hundred each.
In any society the most headache problem is full-
employment. The foreign manufacturers in Hong Kong provide
jobs for about seventy-thousand workers and can accoi:,modate
still more because of the existing ` vacancies.
Since eniployrient is highly correlated with output
( Correlation coefficient : 0.8231 ) the ten percent of total
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Table 5.13
Employment Condition of Manufacturing Companies
■
'a) ( e )( d)(b) (c))
6niployment Growth RateEnovunent (irowth rate (f)=(b)/(d)ifear 0/(Hongkon)(Foreign-Owned C/: 70
6,352 £1.A.P re 1960
5.0883 228,92911,6301960
0.39 6.8836 229,84161 15,803
8.35273 , 593 21.214762 23 , 270
8.48 8.81302,23463 26,641 14
9.9031 353,57135,00664 16.98
357,49142,99065 1.11 12.0323
376,71166 49,624 5.38 .3.1'715
431,9736 7 51,075 3 1.8216.26
68 3 507100052.636 17.37 .0.38
54 , 780 4 9.7469 562,000 10.85
70 590 , 000 4.98 N.A.N•A. kJ *A*
Source: Appendix XI
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industrial employment certainly represent a great contribution
to Hong Kong's manufacturing output and hence national income.
Ilong Kong is an export oriented economy, thus, any increase
in output will contribute to a sizeable increase in foreign
exchange and the balance of trade position.
l1Employment is also correlated with technical change
t Correlation coefficient : 0.5243 ). Eye can say that the
fast employment growth on the part of the foreign manufacturing
firms is induced by an introduction of higher technology.
However, we cannot say that the mere provision of
employment opportunities benef its Fong Kong . Hong Kong has
been facing a lack of workers for quite a period of time 12.
For example, in the electronics industry there were reported to
have forty-four hundred vacancies in October, 1966 and was
forecasted to have nearly ten thousand vacancies around February,
196813. The conditions :for other industries were no better.
We therefore can conclude that their presence represp,ats an
opportunity cost to Long, Long.
5.4 Production and larket of the Foreign owned iYianufacturinp-
Companies.
I-'roduction
t Vi L11V' CUi C1tUCUV 1 V ilCGCialJC 1JUUUiW1JJ
manufacturing companies with foreign interests had a total
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Table 5.14
Production and ]Exports of Foreign Manufacturing Companies, 1969.
xluu(e)=di/d totalC)Ibi/bi t.ntall (a)(b)(a)
PercentageProduction Percentage Exports( I ILK$ )Industry








99.608.806.51 111,848,992taade ups 112,287,992


















73.92100.00TOTAL 1,718,497,200 100.00 1,270,464,468
Source: Calculated from Appendix XIII
f=di/bi
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production of H.K. $ 11718,497,200. Fifty percent ( or
11.K.$859,379,474 ) was accounted for by the electronics industry.
The garments had nine percent and the fabrics had 8%. ( see
Table 5.14 ) .
Market
Of the $1,718,497,200 of goods produced by the
factories with foreign interest $1,270,464,468 ( or 74% )
was exported directly. This value accounted for about 12%
of H long Kong's domestic exports for the same year.
Of these exports the electronics industry accounted
for 61% of the volume exported. The garments industry accounted
for another 11% and the plastics industry 9% ( See Table 5.14
columns (d) and (e) ).
Most foreign factories Iad over 80% of their products
exported directly. given trough quite a number of industries
retained most of their production, however, :iost of those products
served as inputs to produce other goods for exports ( e.g. yarns
and fabric ). If this factor was considered, it would not be
an exaggeration to say that well over 80% ( and possibly 90% )
of the production was exported.
Analysis
As most of the products are exported, naturally the
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able 5.15
)omestic Exports by Market: 1960 and 1970
(d) (e)a) (c)(b)
19701960

















Source Industrial Investment Hong Kong 1971/1972. P.92.
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foreigners are not doing what most foreign investors in other parts
of the world are doing. They are not producing for this region
or the local market. They are not counter-acting the force of
tariffs. They are not saving transportation costs. They are not
realising the patent or innovation. Hong Kong has no raw materials.
They are not backwardly integrating. the labour cost here is higher
Than other Asian countries. They are not exploiting cheap production
level.
We have no figures showing that how muchof the product-
ion is exported to the respective homemarkets when the foreign
manufacturing companies originally came. However, the greatly
increased domestic exports in the last decade to the markets
that invest heavily in Hong Kong in both absolute value as well
as in proportion ( see Table 5.15 ) hints that perhaps those
companies are producing for their own markets.
Because of the high exports ( 12% of our total domestic
exports ) are ancounted for by the foreign-owned manufacturing
companies, we have to say that they earn us a huge amount of
foreign exchange and contribute muchto our balance of trade
position.
I someinaustrles certainly the foreigners' investment
justifies the opportunity cost. Hong Kong at present has a shortage
of labour which represents the " Bottle-neck " for development.
Some foreign companies can produce more per
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worker than local firms. The electronics factories, for example,
in 1969 the foreigrs can produce 31,000 per worker, whereas the
entire industry can only produce $25,000 per worker for export.
However, in the garments industry local firms can
produce $27,000 per worker whereas foreign owned factories
i^-can only produce $21,000 per worker.
We thus, have to say that foreign companies are noi,
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6.1 Some Statistics of the Study
According to the findings of the Questionnaire (See
Appendix I) and other related sources we derive the following
statistical data!
i) All the eleven responding companies are private limited
companies.
(ii) The countries of origin of them are :
(a) United States • 5 companies (45o45%)
(b) Japan : 5 companies (45945%)
(c) United Kingdom : 1 company (9.09%)
(iii) The dates of their establishment scattered, but most of them
were established in the mid-sixties.
{iv) The sizes of investment+ of the responding companies scatter
'Total investment includes fixed capital and working capital
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widely ranging from below HK $0.5 million to well above
$50 million. Besides, the distribution can be considered
to be rather even.
(v) Most of the companies declare that their investment money
comes from sources outside Hong Kong. Three of the nine
companies that answer this question say their entire capital
comes from abroad. Only one says 97% of its capital is
raised in Hong Kong.
(vi) The long-term finance structure of the eleven firms are
(a) Foreign capital • HK $4595019990 ( 82.26%)
(b) Local capital HK 9,806,019.63 C 17.74%)
(c) Total • HK $5593089009963 (100.005ro)
(vii) The nine companies that fill out the fixed capital question
have a total of HK $32 million of fixed capital. Their
sizes range from HK $0 014 million to HK $ 12.00 million. Their
average size is around HK $3.54 million.
(viii) The types of products the eleven companies produce are:
(a) Consumer goods : 5 companies (45.45%)
(b) Industrial semi-finished goods • 3 companies (27.27%)'
(c) Industrial goods : 2 companies( '18.18 0)
(d) Others • 2 companies (18.18%)
(e) Total :12 companiest
One company produces two types of goods
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(ix) The industries the companies in are :
(a) Electronics • 4 companies (36.36%)
(b) Textiles • 2 companies (18.18%)
(c) Printing • 2 companies (18.18%)
(d) Tobacco : A company (9009%)
(e) Electrical • 1 company ( 9.09%)
(f Jewellery : 1 company (9.09%)
(g) Total • 11 companies
(x) Only ten factories supply production figures. They have a
total production volume of HK $647,302,920 (at market price)
per year*
The largest one (tobacco) produces $230 million per year.
The smallest one (jewellery) produces V61.4 million per year.
(a) The production volumes by countries are:
U.S.A. (5 factories) • HK $339,5009000 (52.45%)
U.K., (1 factory) • HK $230,000,000 (12.02%)
Japan (4 factories) HK 779802,920 (33.53)
Total (10 factories) 100 o• HK $64793029920
fib) Production volumes by industries are:
Electronics (4 factories) HK $232, 500,000 (35.92%)
Textiles (2 factories) HK $15790009000 (24.,25%)
Printing (2 factories) : HK $ 26,400,000 (4.77%)
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Tobacco (1 factory • HK $2309000,000 (35.53%)
Jewe llery (1 factory) • HK 1,402,920 (0 A22)
Total (10 factories) HK $647,302,920 (100.00%)
(xi) The production process (es) of these companies are considered
as:
(a) capital-intensive : 2 factories C 18.18%)
(b) In-between • 4 factories (36.36%)
(c) Labour-intensiveness • 5 factories (45.45%)
(d) Total
: 11 factories (100,00%)
,xii) The technology standing of these companies are considered :as:
(a) Advanced ? factories (63.64%)
(b) In-between : 4 ractories (36.36%)
(c) Low • 0 factory ( 0.00%)
(d) Total : 11 factories (100.00%)
(xiii) (a) When the factories first established in Hong Kona their
production method (s) was (or was not) adopted here:
Adopted • 6 factories (55.56%)
Not Adopted • 4 factories (36.36%)
Don't know • 1 factory (9.090)
-100.00%)Total • 11 factories
(b) Now:
Adopted • 10 factories (90.91%)
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Not Adopted • 0 factory ( (o%)
Don't Know • 0 factory (0%)
: 1 factoryOthers (Similar) (9.09%)
Total : 11 factories (100.00%)
(xiv) The sources of raw materials range widely. One company says
it has all the raw materials purchased locally whereas a few
obtain all their raw materials abroad directly. Of the 647
million's production it is estimated that
(a) The volume produced by material from hone $151m (23%)
(b) The volume produced by material from other places : :365m (56%).
(c) The volume produced by material in Hong Kong : $131rn (21%)
d) Total : CP647m(100%)
(xv) (a) Some companies have all their sales outside Hong Kong and
others have their markets entirely in Hong Kong.
Production for home'. markets : HK $215,875,000 (33.50%)
Production for other places : HK $140,501,898 (21-55%)
Production for local market : HK $290,926$022 (44.95%)
Total (10 companies) : HK $6479302v920 (goo%)
(b) Markets excluding the tobacco company:
Production for home markets : HY $215,875,000 (51.77%)
Production for other places HK $129,001,898 (30.94%)
Homemeans the company's country of origin
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Production for local market : IlK $ 72,426,022 (17.29%)
Total (9 companies) HK $417,302,920 (100%)
(xvi) The markets (by-industry) :
(d) (e)b)(a) (c)
Home OtherIndustry Local Total
llectronics 8215.875.000 $13,550,000 3,075,000 x.2 32, 500,000
3 factories) (92.85%) (5.83%) (1»32%) (100%)
:'extiles $96,300,000 .6070Q 00 $157,000 ,000
(61.34%)2 factories) (o%) (38.66%) (100%)
$107,000,000Textiles (excle yarns) $96,300,000 10,700,000
11 factory) (0%) (90%) (i0%) (100%)
$18,240,000 26,400,000Irinting P 8,160 ,000
12 factories) (o%) (70%) (30%) (100%)
Dbacco $11,500,000 $230,00090006218, 500 ,000
Il factory) (0%) (5%) (95%) (100 %)
jewellery 911t898 $ 491,022 $ 1,402,920
1 factory) (0%) (65%) (35%) (100%)
$215,875,000total v,140,501,898 $290,926,022 $647,302,920
10 factories) (33.50%) (21.55 a' (44-95%) (100%)
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(xvii) Nine companies fill out the employment questionnaire and
their employmentconditions are :
Top level Mid-level Supervisors Workers Total
Expatriate 17 13 7 37
1 ALocal 131 396 4286 4831
Total 14435 403 48 684286
(xviii) The employment figures by countries are:
Fact. Top Level Middle Supervisors Workers Total
rry No. Exp, Local Total E7{= Local Total Ex Local Total Total Exp• Local Total
4 9 15 24 110 110 1110344 344 35883579
24 5 107 2212 127 19 821 22 847 869
1 13 4 3 9 12 40 40 6355 405 411
17 109 1335 131 144 7 396 403 4286 37 4331 4868
(xix) The employment figures by industries are:
Fact. Top Middle Supervisor Workers Total
!n. y No. Exp. Lo cal Total Exp. Local Total Exp Local Total Total Exp. Local Total
63 8 14 60 60 191 191 2310 6 259 2602us
Lt S 1 3 107 50 50 150 150 800 3 1007 1010
ling 2 14 85 135 6 10 16 755 18 771 789
• O 1 13 4 3 129 40 40 6355 405 411
°tica11 1 1 5 2 2 60 08 68
fiery 1 1 1 2 2 A14. 1 8 12
179 18 35 13 131 144 7 396 40 3 4286 37 4831 4868
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The labour quality in Hong Kong is compared favourably to(xx)
other places. The workers are considered patient, disciplined,
intelligent, diligent and skilful. However, turnover rate is
generally acknowledged to be terrible.
Comparing the adaptiveness of local workers with American/(xxi)
European workers, ten factories comment:
• 1 company 10)(a) Extremely adaptive
• 3 companies(b) More adaptive (30%)
• 3 companies(c) Same (30%)
• 3 companies(d) :::.-Less adaptive (30%)
• 0 companye) Unad aptive (0%)
(f) Total • 10 companies (100%)
Comparing with other Asian countries, Hong Kong workers are(xxii)
considered as:
: 1 company(a) Extremely adaptive (9.09%)
(b) More adaptive • ? companies (63.64%)
(c) Same • 3 companies (27.27%)
(d) Less adaptive : 0 company (0%)
(e) Unadaptive • 0 company (0%)
(f) Total • 11 companies (100%)
(xxiii) The previous relations of the eleven companies with Hong Kong
before they come here are:
a) Receive order from Hong Kong • 2 companies (18.18%)
(b) Have agencies here • 4 companies (36.36%)
(c) Own marketing force : 0 company (0%)
0 com nv (O o)(d) Purchase from Hong Kong
(e) Full scale investigation : 5 companies (45.45%)
(f) 0 thers 3 companies (27.27%)
rt(g) Total • 11 companies (100%)
(xxiv) The media that motivates foreignersto invest in Hong Kong are:
(a) Invitation by local sellers • 2 companies (18.18%)
(b) Government promotion force • 0 company (0%)
(c) Own investigation : 9 companies (81.82%)
• 1 company ( 9 .090(d) Others+
: 11 companies (100%)(e) Total
(xxv) In their own opinions their main contributions to Hong Kong
.are:
(a) Know - how • 7 (63.64%)
(b) Employment 6 (55.56%)
Two have no relations and one follows its customers
+Some companies have more than one kind of relationship
1Major market in Asia
Some companies mentioned more than once
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1 (9.09%)(c) Capital
(a) Others 1 (9 .0 90
(e) Total 11 (100%)
(xxvi) The reasons for them to look abroad are :
(c1 RTn nrrnri-»ni +i co a hnmc • 0 company IQ%)
(b) Expansion of market • 4 companies (40%)
(c) Realisation of innovation • 0 company (0%)
• 5 companies (50%)(d) Higher profit
(e) Others • 4 companies (40%)
(f) Tota1+ • 10 companies (100%)
(xxvii) The reasons for investing in Hong Kong are :
(a) Cheap labour • 7 companies (70%)
• 5 companies '50%)(b) Labour quality
0): 0 company(c) Higher profit
• 1 company(d) Low risk (10%)
(e) Others • 3 companies (30%)
(f) Total+ • 10 companies (loo%)
rService to customers
Some companies mentioned more than once
Others include high U.S. labour costs, meet foreign comptition,
supply local market
++Others include supply local market, freedom of export/import work.
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The findings from the personal interviews are brought out
in the following sections. However, the general conditions of the
five companies interviewed are reviewed in Appendix XIV to Appendix
XVIII disguised in Companies A through E.
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6.2 The Reasons for Foreign Manufacturers to Invest in Hong Kong
(i) Raw materials (See 6,1 xiv)
23% of the total raw materials are bought directly from
the home markets or parent companies. The majority of raw
materials come from other places (56%). There is only 21% of
the raw materials bought directly in Hong Kong, Of this, 21%
we can expect a large proportion is imported.
The interviews to a large extend varify this findings too.
Company A buys all its raw materials ( in fact partly processed
semi-finished industrial goods) from its:.'parent company or its
other production points. It does not and cannot find any raw
materials locally.
Company B has half of its raw materials bought locally and
10% from its home market and 40% from other parts of the world*
The conditions for CompanyC, which is in the same industry as
Company B is more or less the same. 45% of its raw materials
are locally procured and 30% bought from other places. The
remaining 25% is transferred from the parent company. The
managing director of CompanyC emphasises the importance of cheap
raw materials abroad that induces its going abroad, Before
coming to Hong Kong, it has been purchasing in Asia, especially,
Japan, though he has never purchased in Hong Kong.
137
Company D adopts the policy of procuring as many raw
materials locally as possible. However, all the strategic
(50%) materials are purchased from the parent company.
Company E imports 95% of its raw materials from home and
the remaining 5% abroad. It tends not to buy in Hong Kong
because it considers Hong Kong can only produce inferior cloth
which may hurt its image.
The figures obtained from the questionnaires seem not
justifying the assumption that raw materials come mainly from
the home markets, but it seems that foreign manufacturers tend
to buy from other parts of the world. Perhaps this is due to
that some companies (like Company A) procure from other overseas
subsidiaries. Company D and E certainly varify the assumption.
Only 21% of the raw materials are purchased in Hong Kong.
This 21% may represent imports by other importers as well as
semi-finished industrial goods processed in Hong Kong but is made
of raw materials abroad. Besides, the manufacturers would procure
raw materials from local warehouses. The 21% certainly implies
that easy raw material: procurement is not a main .factor for
foreign investors to invest here* Company A and E do not buy
or even consider buying raw materials here. Company D has all
its strategic raw materials bought from the parent company.
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Company' C's not buying from Hong Kong before it starts operation
here also proves raw material procurement is not a factor for
foreign manufacturers to invest here.
(ii) Market (See 6.1 xv and 6.1 xvi)
33.5% of the products produced are exported to the respective
home markets. Another 21.55% is exported to other places and the
remaining 44.95% is retained for local consumption. However,
these figures are certainly biased because of the sample size
and expecially because of the presence of the giant tobacco company.
Should we exclude it, 51.77% of the foreigners' production is
exported to their respective home markets, another 30.94% to other
markets and only 17.29%is locally consumed.
Industry-wise the electronics industry has over 90% of the
production shipped home and another 5.83% exported to other Places.
This industry certainly fits the assumption.
The textile industry, however, exports mainly to other places
(61.34%) and retains 38.66% for local consumption. However, the
main contribution to local consumption is from a fabric yarn
manufacturer (84%). Excluding this factory' we should have 90% for
exports and 10% for local use. This exclusion is justified because
the yarns are mainly used as inputs to produce garments for exports e
Both the printing and the jewellery industries export mainly
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to other places and a minor shares retain for local consumption.
The tobacco company, however, is produced mainly for local
consumption.
From the interview, we find that Companies A, B and C all
produce for their home markets and both A and B produce for the
parent companies only.. Although A exports some of its products
to places other than its home country, it exports only to its
parent's overseas subsidiaries for further process. Both Company
B and C has realised the importance of the local market, but due
to capacity limitations they cannot produce for local consumption.
Anyway when they first started operations here they did not intend
to produce for local consumption.
The electrical manufacturer, Company D is in a service
industry and cannot export directl However, it is estimated
that over 95% of its products are exported indirectly.
Company E is a rather strange but good example. It demonstrate:
our buy foreign inclination very well. Though the Company has
a sizeable market segment in the local apparel market, most of
the goods it sells here are imported. from other production points.
The products produced in Hong Kong are sold to the European market.
From the above findings we can justify the assumption that
foreigners here tend to produce a very great portion for their
140
home markets and other places. They are not looking towards the
local market when they come here.
(iii) Realization of technology (See 6.1 xxv)
Though most companies emphasizes their contribution to know-
how, their markets are not Hong Kong or South East Asia. Thus,
even if the products are produced elsewhere, the technology would
also be realized.
Besides, no company mentions (6.1 xxvi) that the realization
O -r innovation is a* reason for these foreign manufacturing companies
too abroad.
CompanyID, however, emphasizes the importance of the realization
of technology. The reason is that it cannot export or import its
nrn rz+ rdi rPt-+1 v_
Other companies interviewed express they would not experience
much loss in the application of technology, if they do not produce
here*
Thus, it can be concluded that the assumption that technology
realization is not important for foreign manufacturers in Hong Kong
is true.
iv) Exploitation of cheap labout (See 6.1 xxvii)
70% of the companies express that cheap labour is that reason
for them to come to Hong Kong. But, they remark: originally not
141
now , cheap labour advantages declining , not lowesti Laoour
cost area, etc.
In the interviews all companies complain about the fast
rising cost of production. Company A even goes so far as to
decrease its size of operation from 1,200 workers in 1972 to
800 in 1973• It sub-contracts some of its operation to Taiwan.
Company B reduces the growth rate sizeably because of the high
cost of labour and other factors. Company C establishes some
overseas operations in other Asian countries so does Company E
to counteract the high costs.
We can therefore conclude that some foreigners might have
been attracted to Hong Kong by _its cheap production costs. It
is certainly not so now. The new comers and those who continue
to operate here do not look to Hong Kong as merely an area.of ''
cheap production costs. It is certainly cheaper than the U.S.
and other Western European countries, but not other Asian
countries.
(v) Labour quality.
The production processes of the foreign manufacturers are
either labout-intensive or in-between with only 18% employ capital-
intensive processes. We. thus, can say that the wage content
of every dollar of their products is high. However, we also have
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reached the conclusion tnat 1aoour cost ne 'e 1s n.L611. £V.L V-L611c1 0
are still willing to produce labout-intensive goods here at
higher labour costs indicates that there is something special
in our labour force*
From 6.1 xxi we can say that the quality of Hong Kong
workers, if not better than, at least equals to the Americans
and the Europeans. When comparing with other Asian countries
(6.1 xxii) we can conclude that Hong Kong workers are more
adaptive than other Asian countries.
The open-end question shows that foreigners consider local
workers are good' 19 favourably, hardworking and active in
business,* more intelligent, diligent, disciplined, etc.
One company perhaps describes the situation best by saying that
cheap labour advantage declining, however, is offset by quality
workmanship.
Better quality and more adaptive works can explain nothing
without considering our products. Our products are produced for
the Americans, Europeans, Japanese,etc. - the rich (See 6.2 ii)
Naturally they demandquality goods that embodygood workman. ship.
From the next section (6.3) we understand that we do not produce
merely standardized products, but differentiated standardized
products. These products has to be produced by skilled labour.
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We can only imitate standardized products with ordinary workers,
but we can produce differentiated standardized products with our
skilled labour. Only Hong Kong workers are entitled to do this
at such a low cost - much lower than the Americans (though higher
than other LDC's) .
Company A sub-contracts some processes to some Taiwan
factories. However, it hasto retain 800 high cost labourers to
produce. It is explained that the Taiwanese cannot learn the
tricks. Company C establishes production points in the Philippines
to exploit the cheap labour there. Company B maintains an engineer
team here to develop some eye-pleasing radio-sets. The Company
expresses that the innovative nature and design-oriented nature
of the Hong Kong workers contribute to its ability to stand up.
CompanyE emphasizes the importance of the intelligence,
diligence and discipline of local workers. The garments obsolete
very easily. It is extremely important for the workers to learn
fast, produce fast so that the Companymay export fast and market
fast. The Companyhasproduction points in the hTDC' s to produce
highly fashioned garments. It also produces in the LDC's to
produce the standardized goods, Hong Kong fills the gap.
Thus, both the findings of the questionnaires and the interviews
re-inforce each other. The adaptiveness of local labour explains why
foreign-owned ma! ufacturing companies come to Hong Kong.
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6.3 The Product Cycle
From 6.1 xi we find that foreign manufacturing companies
adopt labour-intensive production methods. 6.1 xii we derive
that the products produced by the foreign manufacturing companies
are exported to the MDC's.
According to Professor Raymond Vernon and his associates
the products produced in the LDC's are standardized. Thus,
the technology involved should be relatively not advanced.
comparing with the respective industries as a whole. The dumping
of standardized products is only possible with scale economies
which represent relatively capital intensiveness. However, these
are not so in Hong Kong.
Prom 6.1 ix we know most companies here are not new
industries. They produce well acquainted products. However,
though the foreigners produce standardized products they use more
labour to think, to design and to innovate+. They produce
differentiated standardized products.
The findings of the interviews support the argument better.
CompanyA realizes that it cannot compete with the cheap labour
areas. It sub-contracts some of the more standardized processes
to the Chinese manufacturers in Taiwan. It also understand that
In Schumpeter's sense.
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it cannot compete with the giants and its, parent company in
producing the powerful computers that need high technology.
It concentrates in a different segment - the mini-computers.
Company B is another good example. It cannot compete
with Taiwan in producing ordinary radio sets, In order to
survive and make good profits, it takes the advantage of the
adaptiveness of the local labourers and the presence of good
engineers and designers. It produces interesting, attractive
and eye-pleasing radio sets.
The most outstanding example is Company D. Electro-plating
is something well understood by all. Company D develops the
electro-plating of plastics which represents a differentiated
standardized product.
Vernon and his associates argue that environment induces
the Americans to develop new products. In Hong Kong because the
labour cost here is higher than other LDC's. We cannot have
very original products because of the lack of R D. We have
an adaptive labour force. We have engineers and designers. Our
environment forces Hong Kong, especially the more. liberal minded
foreigners to venture into some differentiated standardized
products.
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6.4 The Way Foreign-Owned Manufacturing Companies Make Decisions
The findings reviewed in 6.1 xxiii say foreigners pursue
full-scale investigation (45%) first before they open a
manufacturing company here. 36% of them have agencies here
before coming here and 18% have been selling here before.
6.1 xxiv suggests that over 80% of the foreign manufacturing
companies in Hong Kong are motivated by their own investigations.
Another twenty percent of them are invited to start business here
by local sellers and agencies. While all LDC's governments play
a very important role in promoting foreign investment the Hong
Kong Government is dis-interested in this.
Though the above findings can hint that the wholly-owned
foreign manufacturing companies in Hong Kong have some sort of
relations with Hong Kong before entering, it is not strong enough
to verify the sequential game theory.
CompanyA has a marketing research unit here long before it
established a central or regional office here to look after the
sales, marketing and administrative problems in Hong Kong as well
as in the Par East. Not till 1964 did it begin to produce some
electronic parts in Hong Kong and even then it had only a working
force of fifty which gradually increased to 1,200 in 1972. The
Companyat first produced more simple parts and gradually ventured
147
into producing more complicated parts. Thus, Company A seems
to fit in the sequential game theory.
Company B is a world famous electrical and electronics
producer and marketer. Long before it produced in Hong Kong,
it had marketing activities in the Colony. Even with the
knowledge the Company played safe by purchasing the building,
equipment, machinery, etc. Of a famous local electronics
factory as well as getting s ome of its working force from the
former factory to eliminate uncertainty. Though the Company
purchased the entire building, it started in a small way and
gradually utilized the entire building and then extended to
next door as well as eventually had another building. Certainly
its actions represent a chain of actions to purchase information
over time.
CompanyE is a typical example of the sequential game theory.
It had been selling to Hong Kong for quite a period of time by
means of exports through agencies. Later, it established its
marketing forces. In 1965, after some investigation it established
a joint venture to produce finishing goods with a famous local
textile factory. In 1969 after Hong Kong recovered from the bank
crisis and the riot days, it decided to grow. In 1971, the Company
bought the entire production point over and was free from local
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ownership. In the same year the Hong Kong office was made head
of Asia and Pacific area. In 1972 and 1973 the Company was to
re-organize in all areas so that it could become a modern and
large manufacturing company.
One thing about Company E that needs to be mentioned is
that the Company's cheap machines in the earlier days represented
a hinderance for development. They often represented a source
of bottleneck.
According to both the questionnaire as well as the interviews
we can say that the sequential game assumption is true on the
whole. It is necessary for the foreign manufacturing companies
to buy information overtime so as to minimize risks and to maximize
the value of each dollar of information. However, because of our
easier communication and better reputation, foreign investors
are more readily to pursue full-scale operations here.
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6.5 Cost - Benefit Analysis
(1) Balance of Payments Effect
6.1 vi shows that 80% of the long-term finance of the
foreign-owned manufacturing companies comes from sources outside.
Hong Kong, This represents an improvement in our balance of
payments account.
6.1 x shows that over 80% of their products are exported.
This results a better-ment of our balance of payments as well
as trade balance.
However, 6.1 xiv shows that more than 80% of the raw
materials used by the wholly-owned foreign manufacturing companies
are imported. This represents a great adverse effect in our
trade balance.
The companies interviewed declare that they do not remit
their profits back to their home country, but use the money for
further expansion.
From the above findings we can say that the presence of
the wholly-owned foreign manufacturing companies here contributes
to our balance of payments. However, this contribution is not
very important because we have not got any balance of payments
or-oblems.
(ii) Investment Fund
6.1 vi indicates that the wholly-owned foreign manufacturing
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companies in Hong Kong finance 82% of their long-term investment
from funds provided by the parent companies. However, 6.1 xxv
shows that only 10% of the companies consider the provision of
funds for investment their contribution to Hong Kong.
Hong Kong is well developed and its propensity to save is
high. Local people can always get enough money to finance
investment projects.
Thus, though foreigners may provide capital for investment,
this is not an important factor.
(iii) External Economies and Opportunity Costs
6.1 xxv says that 64% of the wholly-owned foreign manufacturing
companies consider the supply of know-how their most important
contribution to Hong Yong.
6.1 xx indicates that the turnover rate of labour is terrible.
Technological know-how diffusion is the most important source
of technical advancement in Hong Kong. The most important way
to diffuse is through the know-how embodied in workers who move
to other jobs. Thus, the high turnover rate of labour and the
technology of the foreign owned manufacturing companies enable a
faster development of Hong Kong.
The development of Hong Kong depends on the inflow of know-
how. Foreign manufacturing companies here certainly benefit
Hong Kong.
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In the personal interview Company A reviews that the Company
is a training centre for other computer factories in Hong Kong.
When it has trained a worker he would seek another job in other
electronic manufacturing companies carrying with him the technology.
The few computer memory system builders in Hong Kong are offsprings
of the CornpE ny. One factory has its managing director, middle
managers and supervisors and most of the workers formerly worked
in CompanyA.
However, the interviewee remarks that the really crucial
technology in the field is not transferred from America.
Company p is another good example of the source of technological
diffusion. When it starts business people in Hong Kong c'n only
perform metal electro-plating. However, the electro-plating of
plastics is diffused out and a few of the local factories are
doing the job.
According to the impression it is undoubtedly true that the
most important benefit that the wholly-owned foreign manufacturing





Hong Kong has ceased to be an entrepot. Though the
absolute importance of trade, service, finance, and other
entrepot operations are not less important, their relative
importance gives way to the new emerging sector - the manu-
facturing industries.
The foreigners are playing an important role an this
area. We can say that they cmmmandabout 10% or more of our
total investment, production, employment and other measuring
rods of this sector of our economy.
However, the main reasons for them to choose Hong Kong
differ from the main reasons a person chooses a foreign prod-
uction location. They cannot look to international backward
integration here. They do sell here. They are not counter-
acting the force of trade barriers ( e. g. tariffs, quotas,
etc. ). The main reason for them to invest here is our labour
characteristics.
We have good infra-structure of labour - people who
know how to sell to foreign markets. The sudden increase of
cheap and aboundant supply of labour provide a force for the
foreigners to take-off and establish manufacturing companies
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here.
Cheap and abundant labour supply are no longer the
main motivations for foreigners to invest in the manufacturing
industries in Hong Kong. It is the labour quality that provides
the incentive for foreigners to establish new manufacturing
firms here or to remain here. The highly adaptive labourers
who are comparable to the best workers in the world with our
lower wages attract them here.
Though we have not got the environment for new products,
our adaptive labourers and environment extend Professor Vernon's
Product Cycle Model to a further stage - the differentiated
standardised products.
In deciding to invest in Hong Kong the foreigners are
rather cautious. They tend to go step by step instead of in
great leaps. It is thought that they prefer to buy information
over time so that they marry to Hong Kong (and obtain the benefits)
as well as plan to divorce from Hong Kong without great loss.
However, comparably speaking, foreigners invest more readily
in Hong Kong than in other places.
The foreign wholly-owned manufacturing companies in
Hong Kong have good as well as bad impacts in our balance of
payments positions, capital formation, government revenue and
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income level. However, their effects are negligible at our
present situations. The most important impact of the foreigners'
establishing manufacturing companies in Hong Kong is technical




A STTh)Y OF TILE WHQLLYOWMEDFPKEICB
QUBYTLONNAIRE
Note a 1 e All information supplied is used for academic analysis only and
is kept strictly con_' idential.
2. Please fill out the questionnaire at your earliest convenience
and mail it with the envelope provided.
3. Thankou very much,
1. The country of origin of ypur Companyis
2. The type of industry your Companybelongs to is
'he tve of nr_ oduct of your CompanyisL/
Capital goodsConser P?'oods
Industrial semi-finished goodsIndustrial goods
Others (please specify)o. `
4. Your Company(in {long Kong) is established in the year
na.ni ta.l structure of your Companyis as follows
Paid-in capital
Undistributed profit
Amount raised outside hon Kon
Amountraised in HongK on.(,..-
oe The total volume of machinery and equipment of your Companyis
aboutii 11
7. The total asset ofour Companyis,.,
,It_1eli000001- 1,000,4000elow uIX 500 , 000
590009001 `10900090001 .000 0001- 5 00009000
50,000,001 and above1090009001 - 5090009000
8. Flow do you consider your prouction process es)
In-. betweenCapital intensive
Labour intensive
9. Do you consider your Companyadvanced in technology:
NoIn-betweenYes
10. The employmentstructure of your Companyis (insert No. of employees





Impo±tedfrom 1-* omecountry?Howmuchof your raw material is:
Imported from other places
Purchased in ±on Kong?
19- 'hp- pr et-i_on volume of your Com-gan perear) is about l
13. Howmuchof your productis: = Exported. to 4 ioruu marR-et















1 L'! e 'hat are the reasons for you to look abroad instead of investing at homc'l














16. In facing new environments how do you evaluate the adaptiveness oz .iiong
Hong workers:
a. Whencomparing with U.S./European workers
More adaptivel xtrL--,mely adative
Less adaptiveThe same
Unadaptive




17. Howdo you compareHonk Kongworkors vatn worKers in oiner fi,e:5:
18.List the most important r,ea-sons you do not invest in portfolio in HongKong
instead?
19. List the most important reasons you do not export from Home(or other
Points ofr_oduction) instead?
20. List the most important reasons you do not persue joint venture here?
21 , '5'hen you first started production here, were there any local factories
Usinrx the samemethod(s) of production as you did?
Don't knowNoYes




23. '`+hat do you consider the most imortant contribution of your Companyto
Hong Kong?
EmploymentKnorr how
Supply o. fund fo_:, invcstra Dxit I_..._ `Others (phase: specify)
24. The m diurn that no t iv:-. t edouto inv . s t in HongKong:is.-




25 o Before you invested in 1 on Kon what rel.i.tions did you had with the
HongKongmar' ct?
Orders from loc--Al mrketers
You have established an agency
Direct marketing force
Purchased from Hong I ong
Full scale investigation
Others (please specify)
26. Can you give me an annual report of your Compny?
It is enclosed
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Certainly,you would like to know about the foreign-
ownedmanufacturing firms in Hong Kong.If you will oomplete
my questionnaire and return the enclosed form(in a separate
envlope),I will sendsendyoueith without abligation a summaryof
my Master's Thesis entitled"A Study of the Wholly-owned
Foreign Manufacturing Companiesin HongKong."
Your help in completing my questionnaire will be of
great value in contributing to a better understandin of
the foreign-owned manufacturing companies in HongKong.I
believe that you will also benefit from the sumary of my
thesis,which you receive in May or June of this year.Finally
your cooperation will help me fulfill the thesis requirement
for obtain my Kaster,s Degree in Business Administration
(M.B.A)from the Lingnan Institute of Business Administration,
a graduate division of the Chinese University of HongKong
You will note that I am including two reply envelopes
so that your questionnaire will not be identified.ou can
be assured that all information will be confidential and
will be used only for academic purposes,You should also
feel free to omit any questions on the cuestionnaire.
four coopoeration will be most appreciated.I do hope










The Lingnan Institute of Business Administration
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Shatin, N.T.
Dear Mr. Ng q
I would appreciate receiving a copy of the summaryof
your M.B.A. thesis, A Study of the 1,1holly-owned Foreign
Manufacturing Companies in Hong Kongo I have completed your
questinnnaire and mailed it to you in a separate envelope.






I am also willing to give you a half-hour of my
time for an interview relating to your project. Please




Your of Batalaishncnt and Valua of Fixed
Capital Assets/Fotal Investment
As at Hay 1970
Year No. of Factories
Total Valuo of Fixed
Capital Asscts (valued
at original cost) &





Capital, ets,. . as
assessed at Eay
1970 (HK$)
Pre 1960 20 45,583,014 207,783,567
1960 5 65,534,227 30,774,349
1961 10 26,128,428 54,968,950
1962 13 49,796,496 100,676,218
1963 19 22,053,390 58,627,714
1964 18 92,633,517 135,796,101
1965 16 48,732,544 87,736,544
1966 13 21,657,772 56,913,350
1967 13 5,555,153 21,341,616
1968 13 10,975,100 31,617,334
1969 15 10,519,340 20,533,040
1970 6 593,915 1,980,000
Totel: 161 399,762,896 808,718,563
Source: Commerce and Indusbry Department
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Appendix V
Foreign Investment in Hong Kong
Manufacturing Industry
Position as at 19th Sept., 1972
Establishment
Industry Total Investment
F.O. F.S. TotalJ.v. (HK$)
U.S.A. 11130 47 34 457,879,635.64
Japan 6 269,708,077.519 42 57
United Kingdom 6 2 2214 197,719,492
Australia 8 13,957,715.751 123
Switzerlana 92 25 10,875,444
Germ. Fed. Rep 2 6 8 6,958,666.50
Netherlands 1 1 64 20 ,087,000
Singapore 1 1 64 9,832,000
Philippines 1 1 2,660,0003
Indonesia 1 2,571,150.173 4
Thailand 2 2 4 5, 910,000
Canada 2 2 809,245.25
NewZealand 1 1 10,920,000
Taiwan 12,352,673.575 5
India 1 1 2,350,000
Malaysia 1 1 60 ,000
Pakistan 1 1 150,000
Argentina 1 1 16,500
Panama 1 1 500, 000
Tanzania 1 1 2 750 ,000
France 1 1 335,000
Aggregate 6765 128 260 1,066,432,601.39
Source: Commerceand Industry Department
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APPENDIX VI
American and British Investments in
Hon Kon Manufacturing Industries
British direct investmentIT . S , direct investment (excluding H.K.'s interest)(excluding H.K.'s interest)
year of




















- by country -
(as at 3les Hey,1970)





Jnitcd Staes of merica 61 21 82
Japan 13 28 41





Malaysia - 2 2
Singapore 1 1 2
West Gernaby 1 3 4
Fhilippines 2
1 3
Netherlands 4 - 4
Indonesia - 3 3
Canaoa 1 -
1
Taiwan - 1 1
India - 1 1
Fakjstan 1 - 1
Thai1and 1 - 1
Total *102 *74
*176
Tko toial rocomlod is crontnr ths the trub fiure or ogo oncustriul
concarnsincludedin the survoytor the rossonthat rensonthnt nonccomgnmion
possess nire than onc foreign integest
Source: Commerce and Industry Deoartment
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ALL DNDIA VII
Foreim Investment in Hong Kong Manufactaring Industry
- by Country of Origin



































































The total numberrecordod is grcater than the true
figure of 230 industrial concerns listed in Encl.II
as somecompaniespossossmore than one foroign
interest.
Source: Commerce and Industry.Department
165
Total Investment - Incl. CoIRnk Capital - of □














Chiy Brething/hepaining & Steel Rolling
Mcxtiles (Karns/Fabrics)
WobacceFroducts
Wextiles (Garments & Nade-ups)
Flactic Preducts (incl. Toys)
Euilding & Construction matorials
Wrinting & Book-binding
Food Products & Ecverages
Annatic cils & Ealns
□ Progucts & Accenseries
Metalwarc prodacts (incl. Tcys)
Wetches/Chceks& Accossories
Flesaure Chaft & Accessories








































































Source: Commerce and Industry Department
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APPENDIX X
Investment - by Country of Origin
(by Fully 'orei gn- ownedCorn] anies)









































Total Investment - including













source:. Commerce and Industry Department
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APPENDIX XI






Grovth 6 Avorege Employment
per
factory
pre 1960 20 6,352 317 persons
1960 25 256 11,630 836 465 persons
1961 35 408 15,803 368 451 persons
1962 48 386 23,270 478 485 persons
1963 67 403 26,641 146 398 persons
1964 85 276 35,006 3156 412 persons
1965 101 1908 42,990 2386 425 persons
1966 114 1326 49,625 1556 455 persons
1967 125 114 51,645 38 402 persons
1968 140 106 52,636 38 376 persons
1969 155 115 54,780 45 353 persons
Hay 1970 161 54,990
Source: Commerce and Industry Department
APPENDIX XII
Divioio ok Ininrr - □






































































































































































Source: Commerce and Industry Department
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APFLNDIX XIII
Froduction & Exoort for Period lst January - 3lst December,
Class of Indastry
Mactronics
Extilon (rments & Ko-uos)
Extilon (Yanns/Febrics)
Flastio Products(incl.Toys)
Ship Broaking/Ropairing & Steel Rolling
●●●●●preducts
alre Products (incl. Toys)
Food Products & Poveragos






































































































Company A is one of the forty-nine production points of
a very large and well-known American Company. The parent company's
products included aeroplane, submarine, rocket, computer, etc. The
Hong Kong operation is a subsidiary of the electronics division of
the home company producing computer parts.
The local operation in manufacturing started in 1964.
Before that there was a small office doing marketing research work
and gathering other information and was controlled by the office in
Japan. However, the office in Japan was later eliminated and moved
here.
In 1964, the factory employed fifty workers which gradually
rose to 1,200 in 1972 and then dropped to 800 in 1973. The main
reason for this contraction was the rise of labour cost making the
company sub-contracting the relatively simple operations to Taiwan.
The products are semi-finished industrial goods. The raw
materials are also semi-finished goods imported from other points of
production and the product represent only a few processes further and
far from finished computers. The seven operations undertaken in
Hong Kong are core-grading, core-loading, core-strenging, core-
soldering, coating, inspection and testing.
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At the present moment the company switches from producing ordinary
core-memory to mini-computers. All the products are shipped to the
parent company for further process*
Although there are many electronic companies in Hong Kong,
there are only five to six manufacturing computer memory systems.
Most of the others can only produce one or two simpler operations.
The company is considered to be the training centre of the industry
as quite a number of computer manufacturers here have people formerly




Company B is a subsidiary of a world famous electrical
and electronic company producing many kinds of electrical appliances,
Hong Kong was originally the answer to the rising labout cost of the
United States. It produces only radio sets in Hong Kong.
In 1967, it purchased the factory building, equipment,
machinery and inherited some workers from a famous local electronics
company and started with a few hundred workers. It gradually expanded
to a total of fifteen hundred. The Company has a ten to twelve times
expansion in productive volume .
ine company maintains an engineering group to develop new
concepts for its standardised from products. It produces only for




The Company is a subsidiary of an American electronic
company producing radio sets for the U.S. market. Because of high
material costs, the parent company had been looking for raw materials
from the Far East, especially from Japan.
In 1964, high U.S. labour cost and competition from Japan
stopped the U.S. from producing radio sets and Hong Kong was chosen
as the production point after a full-scale investigation. Because
of the riots in 1967 and the increase in production costs, the company
chose Taiwan as another production point,
The product is sold to the States. The local market is
neglected because of the lack of production capacity.
The Company was one of the pioneers of the industry. At




The Company has Japanese interest. The parent company in
Japan has been providing industrial services in the electrical field
with specialisation in electro-plating. It has a laboratory to
preform the necessary research and development.
In 1965, the Japanese came to Hong Kong and established
the factory here with the help of some local businessmen who ran the
business. The Japanese come here very occasionally except to introduce
new technology. Now the company specialises in plastic electro-plating.
The product is an semi-finished industrial goods (or service).
It cannot be imported or exported. When the company first came here





CompanyE is a subsidiary of a very large apparel. company
in the States. The parent company has more than a century of history.
It has production points all over the world except in Africa.
In 1965, it started producing here. At that time it was
only a joint venture. In 1969, the Company decided to grow. In 1971,
it became a wholly-owned company and was the headquarter of Asia and
Pacific area.
The Companypurchases all raw materials from its home market
and trains its own workers. One special feature about the company is
that while it exports nearly all its products, it imports from other
places for local consumption.
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9一
提
者
，
為
外
資
工
廠
在
早
期
亦
有
因
本
港
工
資
極
度
低
廉
而
在
本
港
設
廠
，
惟
近
年
來
廉
價
工
資
已
作
吸
引
外
資
之
條
件
。
此
外
各
外
資
工
廠
皆
能
传
入
較
新
技
術
，
及
為
本
港
其
他
工
廠
訓
練
工
人
，
此
為
外
資
工
廠
對
本
港
之
最
大
貢
獻
。
其
他
情
形
，
與
第
三
段
□
異
，
不
再
赘
述
。
8起
擴
散
作
用
，
對
本
港
工
業
技
術
，
有
一
定
之
領
導
作
用
，
此
為
外
資
工
廠
對
本
港
之
最
主
要
貢
獻
。
四
、
調
查
作
者
曾
對
外
商
在
本
港
設
廠
之
情
況
，
作
一
全
面
性
之
調
查
並
分
析
是
否
与
上
述
假
定
吻
合
。
是
次
調
查
，
包
括
查
閱
各
有
関
團
體
之
紀
錄
，
郵
寄
問
卷
及
親
身
訪
問
。
根
据
調
查
所
得
，
外
資
工
廠
在
全
港
工
廠
投
資
、
雇
工
數
量
、
外
銷
、
產
量
等
總
額
中
約
佔
百
分
之
十
至
十
五
，
預
料
外
資
工
廠
在
今
後
數
年
內
，
將
佔
有
更
重
之
地
位
。
至
於
其
他
分
析
，
與
第
三
段
之
假
定
極
為
吻
合
。
其
中
值
得
7資
金
，
亦
調
走
利
潤
，
但
為
數
作
目
，
外
商
雖
投
入
資
金
，
並
形
成
固
定
資
本
，
然
若
該
等
廠
商
撤
走
，
本
地
商
人
亦
有
足
夠
之
資
金
及
能
力
彌
補
。
外
資
工
廠
對
本
港
最
重
要
之
影
响
，
厥
為
外
在
经
济
与
不
经
济
。
外
資
工
廠
在
香
港
，
佔
有
頗
大
之
比
例
，
而
本
港
□
論
工
人
廠
房
設
備
，
道
路
等
，
均
有
供
□
應
求
之
現
象
。
外
資
工
廠
之
存
在
，
對
本
港
而
言
，
機
會
成
本
頗
高
，
其
應
否
存
在
，
胥
視
其
貢
獻
而
定
。
若
干
外
資
工
廠
，
如
電
□
工
廠
，
較
本
地
工
廠
更
能
有
效
利
用
本
港
之
資
源
，
立
製
衣
工
廠
，
其
效
率
則
在
本
地
廠
家
之
下
。
一
般
而
言
，
外
資
工
廠
之
生
產
技
術
較
本
地
廠
家
為
高
，
能
6成
熟
產
品
。
本
港
所
生
產
者
多
為
利
用
本
地
工
人
適
應
能
力
，
將
成
熟
產
品
加
以
改
良
，
或
略
作
改
变
以
適
合
不
同
偏
好
之
消
費
者
所
需
之
產
品
，
因
此
能
放
國
際
市
場
中
佔
一
席
位
。
本
港
之
外
資
工
廠
，
雖
然
亦
有
逐
漸
擴
充
之
情
形
存
在
，
不
少
廠
家
，
在
未
於
本
港
設
廠
生
產
以
前
，
經
已
與
本
港
有
極
大
之
連
繋
，
或
曾
由
其
本
國
之
生
產
點
，
輸
入
貨
品
，
或
者
在
本
港
設
舖
推
銷
，
而
對
在
本
港
設
廠
，
較
其
他
地
方
，
較
具
信
心
，
多
能
迅
速
設
廠
生
產
。
香
港
對
外
資
工
廠
之
顧
慮
，
亦
較
具
他
後
進
之
東
主
國
為
少
外
商
放
本
港
之
國
際
收
支
，
影
响
不
大
，
雖
然
該
等
廠
家
既
滙
入
5城
市
，
其
間
外
資
實
佔
一
重
要
席
位
。
香
港
彈
丸
之
地
，
原
料
缺
乏
，
市
場
有
限
，
且
工
業
產
品
多
為
出
口
而
生
產
，
而
生
活
水
平
，
又
較
和
般
後
進
國
家
為
高
，
是
以
外
資
流
入
本
港
之
原
因
，
與
其
他
地
區
之
外
資
工
廠
不
同
。
作
者
以
為
其
最
主
要
原
因
乃
香
港
具
備
最
佳
之
勞
工
，
蓋
香
港
之
工
人
，
最
能
適
應
工
作
環
境
，
又
善
於
學
習
新
技
術
，
遠
作
其
他
後
進
國
所
能
比
擬
，
而
工
資
方
面
，
雖
□
昂
□
後
進
國
，
然
與
欧
美
各
國
比
較
，
仍
屢
低
廉
，
故
能
吸
引
外
商
。
香
港
所
生
產
之
貨
品
，
雖
因
環
境
所
限
，
未
能
出
產
高
技
術
水
準
之
新
產
品
，
然
亦
作
一
般
後
進
國
所
能
大
規
模
生
產
之
廉
價
9模
生
產
。
商
人
在
外
國
設
廠
，
類
皆
極
為
小
心
。
在
未
設
廠
以
前
，
或
曾
出
口
，
或
設
有
銷
售
代
理
，
對
該
市
場
，
早
有
所
認
識
，
故
風
險
不
致
太
大
。
外
資
工
廠
之
設
立
，
對
東
主
國
及
當
地
廠
商
，
頗
多
影
响
，
其
中
包
括
東
主
國
之
國
際
收
支
，
資
金
與
資
本
之
形
成
，
經
濟
發
展
，
政
府
稅
收
，
外
在
經
濟
與
不
經
濟
等
等
。
此
等
影
响
屬
好
屬
壞
，
須
視
個
別
國
家
而
定
。
三
、
本
港
外
商
投
資
之
一
般
情
況
目
大
陸
变
色
，
美
國
禁
運
，
香
港
由
一
轉
口
站
而
變
成
工
業
3廢
墟
，
極
須
重
建
，
及
生
產
各
種
產
品
，
仍
須
補
充
，
中
間
有
漏
洞
，
是
以
富
庶
國
家
，
爭
相
在
外
設
廠
，
以
圖
獲
得
更
商
利
潤
。
一
般
商
人
在
外
國
設
廠
約
有
下
列
數
項
原
因
：
⑴
原
料
缺
乏
，
須
向
外
發
展
，
保
證
原
料
充
足
，
如
石
油
是
：
⑵
就
地
生
產
，
競
爭
力
強
，
易
於
知
悉
該
市
場
之
偏
好
；
⑶
後
進
國
家
工
資
低
廉
，
又
免
入
口
関
稅
，
生
產
費
用
較
廉
；
⑷
避
免
經
濟
民
族
主
義
之
影
响
。
其
生
產
之
產
品
，
一
般
而
言
，
多
為
成
熟
之
產
品
，
此
等
產
品
之
價
格
彈
性
極
大
，
生
產
成
本
影
响
銷
售
額
至
压
，
而
又
為
一
般
消
費
者
所
普
遍
接
受
，
故
最
適
合
設
廠
於
後
進
國
家
，
作
大
規
2力
各
方
面
，
皆
不
能
與
先
進
國
爭
一
日
之
長
短
，
故
此
等
國
家
之
經
濟
發
展
，
實
有
賴
先
進
國
科
技
之
輸
入
，
而
外
商
在
當
地
設
廠
實
為
科
技
輸
入
之
一
種
最
佳
方
式
。
在
此
一
方
式
下
，
且
模
仿
外
商
之
操
作
，
所
費
亦
廉
。
是
以
外
資
工
廠
之
於
東
主
國
，
在
科
技
傳
播
上
層
有
利
。
二
外
人
投
資
之
一
般
情
況
早
期
之
外
國
投
資
，
多
為
間
接
性
之
投
資
，
如
購
買
外
國
铁
路
之
股
權
，
及
外
國
政
府
之
債
券
，
直
接
投
資
，
則
以
殖
民
地
式
主
種
植
園
最
為
大
宗
，
但
亦
為
數
不
多
。
這
三
十
年
代
，
經
濟
恐
慌
，
間
接
投
資
損
失
至
大
。
二
次
大
戰
以
還
，
歐
亞
等
地
，
瑟
成
1外
商
在
香
港
工
業
上
之
投
資
一
引
言
一
國
經
濟
發
展
，
與
其
資
本
財
之
多
寡
極
有
關
係
，
而
資
本
財
之
多
寡
，
又
視
投
資
增
長
速
率
而
定
，
對
該
國
民
生
，
影
响
至
大
。
資
本
財
對
一
國
之
經
濟
發
展
固
然
重
要
，
惟
一
國
之
經
濟
增
長
通
常
只
有
百
分
之
廿
五
為
資
本
財
增
加
所
致
，
具
餘
絕
大
部
分
則
為
資
本
財
所
蘊
藏
之
新
技
術
，
故
新
技
術
又
較
資
本
財
之
形
成
更
為
重
要
。
後
進
國
及
小
國
欲
發
展
科
技
，
在
財
力
、
人
力
、
物


